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THE PRIVACY BAILOUT:
STATE GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE
PRIVACY ARENA
COREY A. CIOCCHETTI *
I. PREFACE& BACKGROUND
Today's relationship between government and business is more
intimate than most Americans prefer.' This intermingling intensified as the
United States economy faltered in late 2007.2 The reasons underlying the
transformation are as extraordinary as they are tragic. From 2002 to 2007,
the world experienced a "global boom."3 The multitude of economic
* Associate Professor of Business Ethics and Legal Studies, University of Denver
Daniels College of Business. Please feel free to contact Professor Ciocchetti with
updates, questions and comments at cciocche@du.edu. Thanks to the Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law and the Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal
for generously inviting me to present these thoughts at the March 2010 The
Relationship Between American Government and American Business symposium.
1 See, e.g., Frank Newport, Americans More Likely to Say Government Doing Too
Much, GALLUP (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123 101/americans-
likely-say-government-doing-too-much.aspx. Stating that:
Americans are more likely today than in the recent past to believe
that government is taking on too much responsibility for solving
the nation's problems and is over-regulating business. New
Gallup data show that 57% of Americans say the government is
trying to do too many things that should be left to businesses and
individuals, and 45% say there is too much government
regulation of business. Both reflect the highest such readings in
more than a decade.
Id.
2 Interestingly, the Great Recession is not the only time in American history where
the government has been closely involved with business in the form of bailouts
although historical bailouts pale in comparison to the total dollar amount of Great
Recession bailouts. See, e.g., Jesse Nankin et al., History of U.S. Gov't Bailouts,
PROPUBLICA.ORG, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/specialgovemment-
bailouts.
See, e.g., Sher Verick & lyanatul Islam, The Great Recession of 2008-2009:
Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses, INST. FOR THE STUDY LAB.
(Discussion Paper No. 4934, 2010), http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf. Verick and Islam
state that:
[T]he 2002-2007 period stands out as a case of an unsustainable
boom. There was a surge in various forms of external finance
(export revenues, remittances, private capital flows) that fed a
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success stories enticed the United States government, in combination with
real estate interests, to encourage widespread home ownership. Federal
action, such as:
1. Expansive interpretations of the
Community Reinvestment Act;4
2. Increased risk-taking (including one
prominent accounting scandal) involving
government-sponsored entities such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac;
3. An easy monetary policy,5
combined with rampant greed from the private' sector to contribute to
decreased credit-qualification standards and loose lending practices.6 This
consumption boom in advanced economies and a surge in
investment and exports in the developing world led by China and
other emerging economies. Overall, the increase in credit flows
pushed the cost of capital down. Such a growth experience bred a
sense of robust optimism about the future, especially among
investors in developed economies leading to an underestimation
of risk. This state of mind perhaps contributed to the collective
complacency of policymakers, development practitioners and
multilateral agencies that were evident even at a time when the
seeds of a rather severe global economic recession were being
sown in the US heartland.
Id. at 10-11.
4 See, e.g., John Carney, Three Ways the CRA Pushed Countrywide to Lower
Lending Standards, BUS. INSIDER, June 25, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/
three-ways-the-cra-pushed-countrywide-to-lower-lending-standards- 2009-6
(providing reasons why the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), although it was
only a major factor in approximately six percent of all sub-prime loans, was a cause
of the Great Recession. These reasons include: (1) the creation of artificial demand
for low-income mortgages, (2) the threat of regulation is often as good as
regulation, and (3) the CRA distorted the mortgage market.).
5 See, e.g., Monetary Policy During the Recession of2007-2009, UNDERSTANDING
MKT., May 6, 2009, http://understandingthemarket.com/?p=64. Stating that:
When it became clear to the Fed that the economy was slowing
sharply and that credit markets were in trouble, the Fed took
extraordinary action: they cut rates to virtually zero and then
announced that they would buy (in addition to the usual short-
term Treasuries) longer-term Treasuries and agency mortgage
debt.... But such a large expansion of the Fed's balance sheet
presents an inflationary threat.
Id.
6 See, e.g., J.D. Foster, Understanding the Great Global Contagion and Recession,
HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/
I 0/Understanding-the-Great-Global-Contagion-and-Recession (stating that such
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"easy money" allowed individuals to purchase homes they could not
necessarily afford (especially if times got tough).' Times did get tough as
sub-prime, adjustable rate mortgages hit their triggers. These foreseeable,
yet consciously ignored, obligations increased monthly mortgage payments
drastically and added pressure on the pre-existing real estate bubble. A
cascade of foreclosures by home occupants and real estate investors alike
burst the bubble dramatically and caused lenders and financial firms
holding mortgage-backed securities to suffer catastrophic losses.
Insolvencies spread across the financial and real estate sectors to other
industries as companies issued earnings warnings.' Speculation
surrounding lower than anticipated profits shook the markets while
factors were partially responsible for the Great Recession). The major accounting
scandal involving Fannie Mae included:
Manipulation of earnings to reach earnings targets to maximize
bonuses to company executives. For example, Franklin Raines,
former Fannie Mae chief executive officer and former budget
director under President Bill Clinton, was forced to pay a $24.7
million fine and give up $15.6 million in stock options for his
role in the scandal.
Id.
7 Peter J. Wallison & Edward J. Pinto, Commentary, A Government-Mandated
Housing Bubble, FORBES.COM, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/
13/housing-bubble-subprime-opinions-contributors_0216_peter wallison edward
pinto.html. Wallison and Pinto state that:
The low interest rates of the early 2000s may explain the growth
of the housing bubble, but they don't explain the poor quality of
these mortgages. For that we have to look to the government's
distortion of the mortgage finance system through the
Community Reinvestment Act and the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In a recent
meeting with the Council on Foreign Relations, Barney Frank-
the chair of the House Financial Services Committee and a
longtime supporter of Fannie and Freddie- admitted that it had
been a mistake to force homeownership on people who could
not afford it. Renting, he said, would have been preferable ....
Long-term pressure from Frank and his colleagues to expand
home ownership connects government housing policies to both
the housing bubble and the poor quality of the mortgages on
which it is based.
Id.
8 See, e.g., Yadav K. Gopalan, Earliest Indicator of Bank Failure is Deterioration
in Earnings, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis, Spring 2010, http://www.stlouisfed.org/
publications/cb/articles/?id=1931 (stating that, "[i]n conclusion, while weakened or
deteriorating asset quality is the primary driver of bank stress, the recognition of
this stress has historically first shown up in earnings performance").
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prodding consumer confidence and spending to retreat.' Lower spending
hurt bottom lines, and layoffs, downsizing and unemployment followed.
By the end of 2009, the Great Recession was in full force.10
As conditions worsened, the federal government faced the dilemma of:
(1) bailing out imminently insolvent companies deemed by some to be "too
big to fail" or (2) allowing such institutions to fail and dealing with the
consequences. For the most part, executive officials serving in both the
Bush and Obama administrations huddled with Congress and chose the
bailout route." As a result, the federal government is closely involved-
with mixed results and popularity-in arenas as diverse as Wall Street,12
9 See, e.g., The Dow Jones Industrial Average: December 31, 1974-September 30,
2010, PRIVATEER, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.the-privateer.com/chart/dow-
long.html (showing the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped significantly and
quickly beginning in late 2007; more specifically, the Dow dropped from 14,164 on
October 9, 2007 (a new all-time high) to 7062 on February 27, 2009).
1o Jacob Weisberg, What Caused the Great Recession?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 2010,
at 19.
' See, e.g., Global Financial and Economic Crises 2007-2009, HIST. COMMONS,
http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?financial crisisother-financial crisi
s_bailouts&timeline=financial crisis (showing, in an open-content editing format,
the major events of the Great Recession-including the government bailouts-in a
timeline format).
12 See, e.g., TARP Martyrs: The Political Price of a Good Policy, WASH. POST,
July 5, 2010, at A12. Stating that it is:
[A]lmost time to say goodbye to the Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP), the $700 billion bailout fund that pretty much
everyone hated, even though it arguably saved the U.S. economy.
Unable to win Republican support for their plan to pay for the
financial reform bill with a tax on big banks, Democratic leaders
in Congress opted to get the cash by closing down TARP now,
three months ahead of its scheduled October 3 sunset. For
accounting reasons, this frees up $11 billion. It won't affect the
Treasury Department's ability to respond to any new crises,
which probably would have required additional legislation
anyway. Thus ends the much-maligned "Wall Street bailout." It
spent or committed only $475 billion of the authorized $700
billion and turned a profit on the capital it provided the banks. Its
much-less-than-expected net costs-now $105 billion-are
accounted for by mortgage aid to homeowners and the bailouts of
the auto industry and insurer AIG.
Id. But see Robert Reich, The Continuing Disaster of Wall Street, One Year Later,
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-
reich/the-continuing-disaster-o_ b_285578.html. Reich states:
The mega-bailout of Wall Street accomplished little. The only
big winners have been top bank executives and traders, whose
pay packages are once again in the stratosphere. Banks have
been so eager to lure and keep top deal makers and traders
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automobiles 3 and environmental cleanup.14 More specifically, the United
States made commitments of $23.9 trillion in bailout funds, 5 faces a
they've even revived the practice of offering ironclad,
multimillion-dollar payments-guaranteed no matter how the
employee performs.
Id.
1 See, e.g., KDakotaFund, Ten Reasons Why the Auto Bailout is a Bad Idea,
MOTLEY FOOL BLOGS (Nov. 22, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://caps.fool.com/Blogs/ten-
reasons-why-the-auto/I 12602; see also Ken Dilanian, Obama Lauds Good News
from Auto Industry, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 2010, at A12. Stating that:
The auto bailout was less popular [than the recently passed
financial regulation bill]. Sixty-one percent opposed it in a
CNN/Opinion Research Corp. poll in December 2008. But
[President] Obama said Saturday that the auto bailout was
"absolutely necessary," because GM and Chrysler were on the
brink of collapse. "The best estimates are that more than 1
million American workers could have lost their jobs," he said.
At the time, analysts put the cost of the bailout at as high as $130
billion, but the Treasury Department said this week that it would
be closer to $28 billion.
Id.
14 See, e.g., The Federal Government's Role in BP Oil Spill (NPR radio broadcast
May 25, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
-127114635 (focusing on the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and discussing the
idea that state and local officials are complaining that "the Obama administration is
too slow in channeling supplies and support to protect the fragile coast [and the fact
that] an Interior Department inspector general report describes the inappropriate
behavior of federal regulators overseeing the drilling."). Also consider:
BP has correctly received most of the blame for the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. As the contractor of the rig, there is little
question that BP is responsible for the accident. However, reports
of federal regulatory exemptions and passed safety inspections
should raise questions about the federal government's
responsibility and the role of regulation ... As the owner of the
waters where drilling takes place, the federal government bears
ultimate responsibility for what happens on its property. Even
though it leases the space to private investors, it is the
government that is responsible for protecting public health,
safety, and interests while allowing access to a needed resource
through its regulatory authority. Because the federal government
exercises significant oversight, it shares some liability for what
takes place under the lease.
Jack Spencer, Gulf Coast Oil Spill: Does the Federal Government Share
Responsibility?, HERITAGE FoUND., May 12, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2010/05/gulf-coast-oil-spill-does-the-federal-government-share-
responsibility.
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national debt pegged recently at over $13 trillion and budgets under a
deficit that hovers around $1.4 trillion.'6  Some people attribute this
massive government involvement in business as the reason the United
States averted a second Great Depression. 17 Others cower at the record
sums of money being spent and the idea that federal employees currently
help execute business models they know little about.' 8 As optimists begin
to reemerge and proclaim that the economy is on the mend,' 9 and certain
industries start to recruit new talent,20 these remain tumultuous times for the
United States.21
" See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-4 (July 2009). Stating
that as:
Massive and as important as TARP is on its own, it is just one
part of a much broader Federal Government effort to stabilize
and support the financial system. Since the onset of the financial
crisis in 2007, the Federal Government, through many agencies,
has implemented dozens of programs that are broadly designed to
support the economy and financial system. As detailed in Section
3 of this report, the total potential Federal Government support
could reach up to $23.7 trillion.
Id.
16 See, e.g., U.S. DEBT CLOCK, http://www.usdebtclock.org/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2010) (showing that the "debt per taxpayer" currently stands near $120,000).
17 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Drawing Fire, Geithner Backs Rescue ofA.I.G.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A3 (discussing Secretary Geithner's testimony in
front of a United States House of Representatives Committee and stating that the
"questioning was heated and sometimes took on the air of a cross-examination as
Mr. Geithner said that a collapse of A.I.G. would have been catastrophic and would
have put the United States at risk of a Great Depression.").
18 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Miron, Commentary, Bankruptcy, Not Bailout, is the Right
Answer, CNN, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/29/miron.
bailoutlindex.html?irefrallsearch (discussing reasons why bailing-out struggling
companies is "a terrible idea").
19 See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Poll: Public's View of the Economy is Improving,
CBSNEWS, May 3, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20004000-
503544.html (showing that "[florty-one percent of Americans now say the
economy is improving, up eight points from April and more than at any time during
this recession. Just 15 percent think the economy is getting worse, according to the
poll, conducted April 28-May 2 [2010].").
0 See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall St. Hiring in Anticipation ofRecovery, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2010, at Al. Schwartz states:
While much of the country remains fixated on the bleak
employment picture, hiring is beginning to pick up in the place
that led the economy into recession-Wall Street. The shift
underscores the remarkable recovery of the biggest banks and
brokerage firms since Washington rescued them in the fall of
2008, and follows the huge rebound in profits for members of the
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II. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of massive government involvement in the financial, real
estate and automotive sectors, other important problems linger without
sufficient governmental attention. This Article focuses on one area where
federal intervention has been particularly absent-the realm of individual
privacy in the Information Age. In America, as opposed to the European
Union in particular, the government only sporadically involves itself in
protecting a person's privacy from the prying eye of sophisticated
monitoring technology. The problem is that monitoring in the United States
is increasingly powerful and takes many forms. Online, prominent websites
collect, store and disseminate a great deal of personally identifying
information (PII) without clearly and simply informing users. This is the
case even though such notice is cheap and can be effective. Offline
technology exists to monitor individuals driving in their vehicles, walking
on the street, shopping in the mall, talking on their cell phones and
conducting tasks in and around the workplace. This Article focuses on the
lack of involvement by the federal government to protect both individuals
and their PII from the prying eyes of both state governments and private
businesses/employers.
The Catch-22 is that, today, much of this monitoring exists for
acceptable purposes. For example, monitoring occurs in part to: (1) protect
the public from criminal activity and threats of such activity; (2) create
efficient business practices and work environments; (3) protect institutions
from legal liability; and (4) comply with internal or external investigations.
New York Stock Exchange .... Since employment bottomed out
in February, New York securities firms have added nearly 2,000
jobs, a trend that is also playing out nationwide at financial
companies, commodity contract traders and investment firms.
Though the figures are small in comparison to overall Wall Street
employment, executives, economists and headhunters say they
expect the growth to pick up steam in the coming months.
Id.; see also U.S. Economy Improving Modestly, REUTERS, June 9, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0913384720100609. Stating that United
States:
[E]conomic activity continued to improve since the last report
across all 12 Federal Reserve districts, although many districts
described the pace of growth as 'modest,' . . . .The report . . .
showed consumer and business spending picking up and the job
market improving slightly, while inflation remained in check.
Id.
21 See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler & Alexander Smith, In Deal-Making, Flat is the New
Up, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2010, at B2 (stating that the "trouble is that even though
the United States economy has stopped contracting, big risks still weigh on the
animal spirits of executives. Job growth is anemic and credit markets have had
renewed volatility in the wake of Europe's sovereign debt crisis.").
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Each of these four reasons is valid, and such monitoring is upheld in most
instances by courts as long as it is reasonable. However, as contemporary
monitoring technology becomes increasingly sophisticated, monitoring
parties are better able to hone in on increasingly private details of people's
lives. At this point, monitoring ceases to serve the valid monitoring
purposes and moves into the invasion of privacy arena.
Lacking a clear mandate from Congress on how to protect individuals'
PII from this technology, state legislatures receive pressure from their
constituents to fill the breach-and many state assemblies have legislated
accordingly. The results of such rushed experimentation (a bailout in its
own right, so to speak) has created a patchwork of state regulation and
subsequent judicial precedent which individuals often find hard to decipher
and institutions find hard to comply with. This Article discusses how the
lack of federal involvement in the personal privacy arena has enhanced
state privacy protections surrounding the monitoring of individuals and
their PII. Part II very briefly introduces and evaluates federal protections of
persons and their identifying information from sophisticated monitoring
practices or, more specifically, the lack thereof. This discussion
demonstrates why state governments have been forced to bail out the
federal government and deal with privacy invasions stemming from
excessive monitoring. Part III is rather unique in the literature in this area
and forms the heart of the article. This part comprehensively evaluates how
state legislation interacts with the institutions most intimately involved in
the monitoring of individuals-state governments, businesses and
employers. Specific and common monitoring practices are evaluated and
categorized in a fifty state survey to demonstrate and synthesize the
patchwork nature of state regulation. Part IV concludes that the
contemporary situation is problematic-not in its enhanced protection of
individual privacy, which is a positive-but in the patchwork of diverse
regulations that confuse consumers and excessively reduce
business/employment efficiency. This part concludes with a summary of
the current situation and a call for the federal government to reverse the
bailout by individual states and begin to formulate national standards for
information privacy protection.
III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY
As identified in the preface, the federal government has been
understandably distracted over the past few years. At the same time,
protection of individual privacy and personally identifying information has
suffered from at least a decade of neglect. The problem grows more serious
as invasions become more hostile and complex. Invasions become more
hostile and complex as contemporary monitoring technology becomes
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increasingly sophisticated and institutions begin to implement it
ubiquitously. 22 Even though Congress is aware of these invasions and the
privacy problem in general, federal law does little to comprehensively
protect an individual's privacy and private information.23 When Congress
has chosen to act, it has legislated in a patchwork fashion covering one or
two industry sectors at a time.24 In addition, some privacy protection laws
are extremely outdated and not structured to keep up with evolving
technology. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), for
example, hails from 1986.25 Today, nearly fifteen years of technological
advances have overcome the law's prohibitions and rendered the statute
much weaker than it was designed to be. Although "Congress enacted the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 to protect electronic
communications ... [c]ase law interpreting ECPA is virtually uniform in
finding that employers can monitor with or without consent, even without
notice."26 In the end, this is a topic that has been discussed at length in the
literature and is not necessary to rehash in this section.27
22 See, e.g., Products Overview, ALERTSITE, http://www.alertsite.com/product_
overview.shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2010) (showing the many advanced
technologies used to potentially monitor individuals).
23 There are many privacy advocates in the United States who spend a great deal of
time and energy making the public-and Congress in particular-aware of
contemporary privacy invasions from powerful monitoring technology. See, e.g.,
Workplace Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/workplace/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
24 For examples of federal laws that take an industry-sector approach to protecting
privacy, see Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (providing individuals
with rights concerning their personal information in government records systems);
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2006) (providing
citizens with rights regarding the use and disclosure of their personal information
by credit reporting acts); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (protecting the privacy of school records); Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) (protecting the privacy of
videotape rental information); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47
U.S.C. § 551 (2006) (mandating privacy protection for records maintained by cable
companies). See also Laura Hildner, Defusing the Threat ofRFID: Protecting
Consumer Privacy Through Technology-Specific Legislation at the State Level, 41
HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 144 n.51 (2006).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2001).
26 Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and its
Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace
Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 315 (2003).
27 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 22-
25 (1st ed. 2003) (providing a very good discussion of privacy law at the federal
level); James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues ofAd Hoc Privacy
Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2005) (discussing federal privacy law).
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Focusing more on the employment front, the primary Catch-22 rests
within the employment relationship itself. The vast majority of states (all
except Montana) adhere to the employment-at-will theory, which claims
that employers have mostly free reign in making decisions concerning their
employees. 28  This theory has historically encompassed the idea that
employers can monitor the activities of their employees as long as such
monitoring is not illegal or does not invade an employee's reasonable
expectation of privacy. Today, readily available and increasingly
sophisticated monitoring technology provides management with the ability
to learn intimate details of their employees' lives and activities. Employers
are generally.able to show that their monitoring techniques are legal (due to
a lack of applicable regulation) and/or that their employees had no
reasonable expectation of privacy (due to the fact that the monitoring
occurs on employer property, with employer equipment and/or during work
hours). On the other hand, courts have held that "while privacy
expectations may be significantly diminished in the workplace, they are not
lacking altogether." 29  This tension between employer efficiency and
employee privacy requires the immediate attention of the federal
government as well. Again, this is a topic well covered in the legal
literature and will not be rehashed here. 30 The heart of the Article occurs
next, in Part IV, and identifies, synthesizes and evaluates a topic that is little
discussed in the literature-the protections for individual privacy and P11
analyzed on a state by state basis.
IV. STATE GOVERNMENT AND REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
Individuals are more likely to get results (or at least attention) at the
state and local level. It is much easier to get in touch with a state
representative or city councilperson than a United States Senator. Feeling
the pressure from constituents and suffering from a lack of clear direction
from Congress, state officials have involved themselves rather intimately in
the privacy arena. This process has produced a patchwork of state laws and
legal precedent that might, in the long run, make matters worse. Many of
the problems are caused by the following situations: (1) some states seem to
copy statutes verbatim from related provisions in existence in state or
federal law; (2) while other states harden their stance in an effort to protect
P1I at great expense to its collectors; (3) while the rest create softer PII
protection in comparison or merely ignore the PI protection evolving
28 See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment
Act, 43 AKRON L. REv. 331, 338 (2010).
29 See Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1074 (Cal. 2009).
30 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 28, at 337 n.18 (canvassing the literature and
stating that the "lack of adequate protections for employees' right to privacy from
employer technological monitoring has been well documented by numerous
scholars.").
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around the country; and finally (4) some states do all of the above
depending upon the particular form of monitoring. The following chart
depicts the problem in great detail and is as accurate as possible considering
the camouflaged nature of some state privacy protections and the lack of a
standardized and comprehensive source to draw from in the literature. The
areas covered range from state constitutional protections of privacy to
security breach notification laws. This chart-and this Article in general-
attempts to fill this gap.
CHART I - STATE LEGISLATION PROPOSED OR ENACTED
LEGI-LATIO(I'1-,N 1N
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
APPLIES BROADLY
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
APPLIES TO STATE
ACTION ONLY
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1)
I I.
NINE STATES INCLUDING:
ALASKA (ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22)
ARIZONA (ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 8)
FLORIDA (FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 23)
HAWAII (HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6,7)
ILLINOIS (ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 13)
LOUISIANA (LA. CONST. art. I, § 5)
MONTANA (MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10)
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10)
WASHINGTON (WASH. CONST. art. , § 7)
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MONITORING IN
PRIVATE PLACES
BANNED BY STATE
LEGISLATION
TWENTY-FOUR STATES INCLUDING:
ALABAMA (ALA. CODE § 13A- 1l-33 (2010))
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3019(A)(1) (2010))
ARKANSAS (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101(a) 2010))
*CALIFORNIA (CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2010))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48b (2010))
**DELAWARE (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(6) (2010))
GEORGIA (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2) (2010))
HAWAII (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 711-1110.9, 711-111 (1)(d)-
(e), (g) (2010))
ILLINOIS (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-4(a) (2010))
KANSAS (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (2009))
***LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283 (2010))
MAINE (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511(1)(B) (2010))
MARYLAND (MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-901 to -902
(LexisNexis 2010))
MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539(d) (2010))
MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.746(1)(c)-(d) (2010))
MISSOURI (MO. STAT. § 565.253 (2010))
****NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650
(West 2010))
NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9(I)(b)-(c)
(2010))
NEW YORK (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2010))
****NORTH DAKOTA (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02(2)
(2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470(A) (2009))
SOUTH DAKOTA (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-1 (2010))
***TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-607
(West 2010))
UTAH (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402 (LexisNexis 2010))
*CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION REQUIRED
**ONLY APPLIES TO PLACES WHERE PEOPLE DISROBE AND
HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
* RECORDINGS IN ANY PLACE BUT MUST BE MADE FOR
LEWD, LASCIVIOUS OR SEXUAL PURPOSES
****PRIVATE PLACE NOT REQUIRED
CALIFORNIA (v
NOTICE OF etoed) THREE STATES INCLUDING:
ELECTRONIC MASSACHUSET *COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-305(1) (2009))ELTRNI TS CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (2010))
EQ NEW YORK DELAWARE (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b)(1)-(2) (2010))
PENNSYLVANI *APPLIES TO WIRETAPPING/EAVESDROPPING DEVICES ONLY
A
TWO STATES INCLUDING:
REQUIRED E-MAIL *COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204.5 (2009))
MONITORING POLICY *TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-512 (West 2010))
*APPLICABLE TO STATE EMPLOYERS ONLY
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INTERCEPTIONS OF
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS:
ONLY ONE PARTY
NEED
CONSENT TO MONITO
RING
THIRTY-SEVEN STATES INCLUDING:
ALABAMA (ALA. CODE § 13A- 1-31 (2010))
ALASKA (ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (2010))
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005(A) (2010))
ARKANSAS (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (2010))
COLORADO (COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-9-303 to -304
(2009))
DELAWARE (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(A)(1) (2010))
GEORGIA (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-62(1), 16-11-66 (2010))
HAWAII (HAW. REv. STAT. § 803-42(b)(3)(A) (2010))
IDAHO (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702 (2010))
INDIANA (IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1-5 (2010))
*IOWA (IOWA CODE §§ 727.8, 808B.2 (2010))
KANSAS (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4002 (2009))
KENTUCKY (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.010 (West 2009))
LOUISIANA (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (2010))
MAINE (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710 (2010))
MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § 626A.02 (2010))
MISSISSIPPI (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-531 (2010))
MISSOURI (MO. STAT. § 542.402 (2010))
NEBRASKA (NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-290 (2010))
NEW JERSEY (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2010))
NEW MEXICo (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (2010))
NEW YORK (N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00, 250.05
(McKinney 2010))
NORTH CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287 (2010))
NORTH DAKOTA (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (2010))
OHIO (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (LexisNexis 2010))
OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 176.3 (2010))
OREGON (OR. REV. STAT. § 165.543 (2010))
RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21(a), (c)(3)
(2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-30-20, 17-30-30
(2009))
SOUTH DAKOTA (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20
(2010))
TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (2010))
TEXAS (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 2010))
UTAH (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4 (LexisNexis 2010))
VIRGINIA (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (2010))
WEST VIRGINIA (W. VA. CODE § 62-lD-3 (2010))
WISCONSIN (WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (2010))
WYOMING (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702 (2010))
*CONSENTING PARTY MUST BE PRESENT FOR THE
COMMUNICATION
I I
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INTERCEPTIONS OF
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS:
ALL PARTIES MUST
CONSENT
TO MONITORING
MONITORING OF
EMPLOYEES'
POLITICAL EXPRESSI
ONS CANNOT
LEAD TO ADVERSE
ACTION
TWELVE STATES INCLUDING:
CALIFORNIA (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631, 632 (West 2010))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d (2010))
*FLORIDA (FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (2010))
ILLINOIS (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2010))
MARYLAND (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402
(LexisNexis 2010))
MASSACHUSETTS (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §
99(B)(4), (C) (2010))
MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539(c) (2010))
MONTANA (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2010))
NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.620, 707.900 (2010))
NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2010))
PENNSYLVANIA (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2010))
WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2010))
*ONE PARTY CONSENT REQUIRED FOR INTERCEPTIONS IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
THIRTY STATES INCLUDING:
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (2010))
CALIFORNIA (CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 2009))
COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-102 (2009))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (West 2010))
FLORIDA (FLA. STAT. § 104.081 (2010))
IDAHO (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2319 (2010))
IOWA (IOWA CODE § 39A.5 (2010))
LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (2010))
MASSACHUSETTS (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178 (2010))
MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.508 (2010))
MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § 211B.07 (2010))
MISSOURI (Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.637(6) (2010))
MONTANA (MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-226 (2010))
NEBRASKA (NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1537 (2010))
NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.040 (2010))
NEW JERSEY (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-27 (West 2010))
NEW MEXICO (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-78 (2010))
NEW YORK (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2010))
OHIO (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.06 (LexisNexis 2010))
OREGON (OR. REV. STAT. § 659.785 (2010))
PENNSYLVANIA (25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3547 (2010))
RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-23-6 (2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 (2010))
SOUTH DAKOTA (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-26-13 (2010))
TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-134 (2010))
VERMONT (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726 (2010))
WEST VIRGINIA (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-12(k) (2010))
WISCONSIN (WIS. STAT. § 103.18 (2010))
WYOMING (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-26-116 (2010))
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EMPLOYERS CANNOT
TAKE ADVERSE
ACTION BASED ON
EMPLOYEE OFF-
DUTY ACTIVITIES OR
EMPLOYEE OFF-DUTY
USE OF
LAWFUL PRODUCTS
MICHIGAN
NINE STATES BAN DISCRIMINATION BASED ON ANY OFF-
DUTY LAWFUL CONDUCT INCLUDING:
CALIFORNIA (CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96(k), 98.6 (West 2010))
COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2009))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-5 1q (2010))
ILLINOIS (820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5 (2010))
MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § 181.938 (2010))
*MISSOURI (MO. REV. STAT. § 290.145 (2010))
NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333 (2010))
NORTH CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. 95-28.2 (2010))
**TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (2010))
*ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO ONLY
** NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEE USE OF ANY
LEGAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT
TWENTY STATES BAN DISCRIMINATION BASED ONLY ON OFF-
DUTY EMPLOYEE TOBACCO USE INCLUDING:
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01(F) (2010))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40s (2010))
INDIANA (IND. CODE § 22-5-4-1 (2010))
KENTUCKY (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (West 2009))
LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (2010))
MAINE (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (2010))
MISSISSIPPI (MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2010))
MONTANA (MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(2) (2010))
NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (2010))
NEW JERSEY (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West 2010))
NEW MEXICO (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-11-3 (2010))
NEW YORK (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(1)(b)-(c)
(McKinney 2010))
NORTH DAKOTA (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2010))
OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 500 (2010))
OREGON (OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.315 (2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (2009))
SOUTH DAKOTA (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (2010))
WEST VIRGINIA (W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (2010))
WISCONSIN (WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (2010))
WYOMING (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(iv) (2010))
*ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601-02 (repealed
May 1, 2007))
*RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7.1-1 (repealed
March 1, 2005))
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RFID DISCLOSURE,
RESTRICTION,
SECURITY,
IMPLANTATION &
DEACTIVATION LAWS
FIVE STATES
INCLUDING:
MASSACHUSET
TS
NEW MEXICO
OHIO
RHODE ISLAND
TENNESSEE
ELEVEN STATES INCLUDING:
CALIFORNIA (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.79 (West 2009))
MISSOURI (MO. REV. STAT. § 285.035 (2010))
NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.46515 (West 2010))
*NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.H. REV. STAT. § 236:130 (2010))
NORTH DAKOTA (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-06 (2010))
OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1430 (2010))
TEXAS (TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.032 (2010))
VERMONT (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7 (2010))
VIRGINIA (VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-323.01 (2010))
**WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.202 (2010))
***WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.58.020,
19.200.030 (2010))
WISCONSIN (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.25 (West 2010))
*RFID TECHNOLOGY BANNED ONLY FOR GOVERNMENTAL
USE ON STATE HIGHWAYS TO IDENTIFY
VEHICLE OWNERSHIP OR OCCUPANTS
** RFID TECHNOLOGY USED IN STATE ID CARDS
MUST BE SECURED
***RFID SKIMMING PROHIBITED
FOUR STATES
INCLUDING:
RFID STUDY TASK ARKANSASMARYLAND
FORCE CREATED NEW YORK
NEW
HAMPSHIRE
LAWS THAT
ENCOURAGE/REQUIRE TWO STATES INCLUDING:
RFID IN MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.304 (2010))
IDENTIFICATION VERMONT (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7 (2010))
CARDS
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TWENTY STATES INCLUDING:
*ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4151 to 4152
(2010))
*ARKANSAS (ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-114 (2010))
CALIFORNIA (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22575
(West 2009))
*CALIFORNIA (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11019.9 (West 2009))
*COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-501 to 502
(2009))
**CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471(b) (2010))
*DELAWARE (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9018C (2010))
*IOWA (IOWA CODE § 22.11(1) (2010))
*MARYLAND (MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-624
(LexisNexis 2010))
**MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.84 (2010))
*MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. §§ 13.055, 13.15 (2010))
*MONTANA (MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-17-552 (2010))
***NEBRASKA (NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-302(a)(14) (2010))
*NEW YORK (N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW §§ 203-204
(McKinney 2010))
PENNSYLVANIA (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4107(a)(10) (2010))
*SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-20, 30-2-40
(2009))
**TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2110 (2010))
*TEXAS (TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2054.126 (West 2010))
*UTAH (UTAH CODE ANN. § 63D-2-103 (LexisNexis 2010))
*VIRGINIA (VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3803 (2010))
*REQUIRED ONLY FOR STATE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
**REQUIRED ONLY IF SSNs ARE COLLECTED
***RELEVANT ONLY IF PRIVACY POLICIES ARE VIOLATED
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PROHIBITIONS OF
GENETIC TESTING/USE
OF GENETIC TESTS
THIRTY-FIVE STATES INCLUDING:
ALASKA (ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2010))
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2010))
ARKANSAS (ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-5-401 to -405 (2010))
CALIFORNIA (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12926, 12940
(West 2010))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2010))
DELAWARE (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710-711 (2010))
HAWAII (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to -10 (2010))
IDAHO (IDAHO CODE ANN. § § 39-8301 to -8304 (2010))
ILLINOIS (410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/25; 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356v (2010))
IOWA (IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2010))
KANSAS (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 (2010))
LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302 (2010))
MAINE (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 19302 (2010))
MARYLAND (MD. CODE ANN., HUM. REL. COMM'N CODE §
49B-15 (LexisNexis 2010))
MASSACHUSETTS (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151b, § 4 (2010))
MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1201 (2010))
MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.974 (West 2010))
MISSOURI (MO. ANN. STAT. § 375.1300 (West 2010))
NEBRASKA (NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-236 (2010))
NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.345 (2010))
NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:1 (2010))
NEW JERSEY (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 2010))
NEW MEXICO (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-7 (2010))
NEW YORK (N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 2010))
NORTH CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28. 1A (2010))
OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.2 (2010))
OREGON (OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.300 (2010))
RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (2010))
SOUTH DAKOTA (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20 (2010))
TEXAS (TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.402 (West 2010))
UTAH (UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-45-103 (LexisNexis 2010))
VERMONT (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9333 (2010))
VIRGINIA (VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:1 (2010))
WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.180 (2010))
WISCONSIN (WIS. STAT. § 111.372 (2010))
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TEN STATES INCLUDING:
ALASKA (ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010-.100 (2010))
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7501, 7601 (2010))
*ILLINOIS (5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 179/37 (2010))
*MARYLAND (MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3402
(LexisNexis 2010))
*NORTH CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.10 (2010))
RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-2(2) (2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-2-310 (2009))
*SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-20-180 (2009))
TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2110 (2010))
*TEXAS (TEX. BUS. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 501.052
(West 2010))
VIRGINIA (VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3808 (2010))
*TARGETED TOWARDS USE OF SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBERS ONLY
SEVEN STATES INCLUDING:
CALIFORNIA (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.83- .84 (West 2009))
MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § § 13.055, 13.15 (2010))
MONTANA (MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-17-552(1}-(3) (2010))
*NEW YORK (N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 204 (McKinney
2010))
RHODE ISLAND (R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-2(3) (2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-2-320 (2009))
UTAH (UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-37-201 (LexisNexis 2010))
*APPLICABLE TO STATE AGENCIES ONLY
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FORTY-FIVE STATES INCLUDING:
ALASKA (ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2010))
ARIZONA (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2010))
ARKANSAS (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-101 (2010))
CALIFORNIA (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56.06, 1785.11.2, 1798.29,
1798.82 (West 2010))
COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2010))
CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701 (2010))
DELAWARE (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 (2010))
FLORIDA (FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2010))
GEORGIA (GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-910 (2010))
HAWAII (HAW. REv. STAT. § 487N-2 (2010))
IDAHO (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-104(2010))
ILLINOIS (815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 530/1 (2010))
INDIANA (IND. CODE § 24-4.9 (West 2010))
IOWA (IOWA CODE § 1347.12 (West 2010))
KANSAS (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1347.12 (2010))
LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3071 (2010))
MAINE (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1346- 1350-A
(2010))
MARYLAND (MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504
(LexisNexis 2010))
MASSACHUSETTS (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1-6 (2010))
MICHIGAN (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2010))
*MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § 13.055(subdiv. 2) (2010))
MISSOURI (MO. REv. STAT. § 407.1500 (2010))
MONTANA (MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704(1)- (2) (2010))
NEBRASKA (NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-803 (2010))
NEVADA (NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.010 (2010))
NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20 (2010))
NEW JERSEY (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2010))
*NEW YORK (N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 208
(McKinney 2010))
NEW YORK (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa
(McKinney 2010))
NORTH CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2010))
NORTH DAKOTA (N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01 (2010))
OHIO (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12 (LexisNexis 2010))
OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 161-166 (2010))
OREGON (OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2010))
PENNSYLVANIA (73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2010))
**RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3 (2010))
SOUTH CAROLINA (S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2009))
TENNESSEE (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2010))
TEXAS (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.03
(West 2010))
UTAH (UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-101 (LexisNexis 2010))
VERMONT (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430 (2010))
VIRGINIA (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2010))
WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2010))
WEST VIRGINIA (W.VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101 (2010))
WISCONSIN (WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2010))
WYOMING (WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501, 40-12-502
(2010))
*COVERS GOVERNMENTAL USE OF P1l ONLY
**COVERS BOTH PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL USE OF PI
I _ _ _ _ _ I
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Involvement in the Privacy Arena
A. Alabama
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Alabama is not exactly on the privacy-protective end of the spectrum.
In fact, Alabama state law only requires one party to a communication to
consent to the use of "any device" to overhear or record communications.3'
This is true whether the person monitoring the communication is present or
not.32 Such provisions allow individuals to record their own conversations
and employers to covertly monitor their employees. The covert angle
provides management with a better chance of keeping records and
discovering illegal activity or violations of company policy. On the other
hand, covert monitoring of employees in the workplace negatively impacts
morale. Without consent, a violation of the statute occurs when "there is
(1) a willful interception, (2) of oral communications uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the communication would be in private, (3)
and communication is made under circumstances justifying an expectation
of privacy." 33 Most individuals generally expect that their conversations
are private. However, courts will have to decide whether such an
expectation is, in fact, reasonable. The Alabama code also criminalizes
eavesdropping when a person "intentionally installs or places a device in a
private place with knowledge it is to be used for eavesdropping and without
permission of the owner and any lessee or tenant or guest for hire of the
private place."34 This prohibition would not likely preclude employers
from placing eavesdropping devices in the workplace because management
generally has the "permission of the owner" and the vast majority of the
areas within workplaces are not generally considered private places. It
would ban eavesdropping in restrooms, locker rooms, etc.
2. Statutory Right to Privacy
Tangentially, the Alabama Mental Health Consumers' Rights Act
(MHCRA) creates an interesting situation which might be construed to
provide individuals (and potentially employees) with additional privacy
protections. The MHCRA states that consumers "of mental health services
have the same general rights as other citizens of Alabama. These rights
include but are not limited to the following . .. [i]n residential or inpatient
programs, the right to privacy."35 It is possible, but perhaps unlikely, that
31 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (2010).
32 Id
Ages Group, L.P. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1320
(M.D. Ala. 1998).
34 ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-33(a) (2010).
35 Id. § 22-56-4(a), (b)(18) (emphasis added). The Alabama Code also makes a
similar statement concerning persons with developmental disabilities and traumatic
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Alabama courts might interpret this provision broadly and transfer its
meaning to protect employee privacy in the workplace.
B. Alaska
1. Constitutional Protection
Alaska's constitution states that "[t]he right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this
section.",3 Problematically, the Alaska state legislature has struggled to
clarify this privacy language.n The Alaska courts have held that the
provision does not apply without state action depriving an individual of
privacy.38 These holdings are based on an analysis of voter intent at the
time the provision was enacted. The Alaska Supreme Court held that voters
must clearly intend for the right to privacy to apply to private actors and
that this was not the case with Article I, Section 22.
brain injuries. Id. § 38-39C-4(1 1) (stating that the "rights of persons with
developmental disabilities and traumatic brain injury include, but are not limited to,
all of the following. . . [t]he right to privacy and dignity.").
36 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
37 See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Alaska
1989). Stating that:
We observe initially that this provision, powerful as a
constitutional statement of citizens' rights, contains no guidelines
for its application. Nor does it appear that the [Alaska] legislature
has exercised its power to apply the provision; the parties did not
bring to our attention any statutes which "implement this section.
Id.
38 For instance, a grocery store clerk at an Alaska Safeway was terminated for
failing to cut his hair under the company's grooming policy. Miller v. Safeway,
Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 284 (Alaska 2004) (stating the pertinent facts of the case as
follows: "Frank Miller [an Alaska Native] was terminated from his employment at
Safeway after he refused to cut his hair in accordance with a corporate grooming
policy. He sued on the grounds that the policy discriminated on the basis of race,
religion, and gender, and that it violated his right to privacy.") (emphasis added).
In his subsequent lawsuit, the Alaska court held that this policy by a private
employer did not constitute state action and, thus, the privacy protection of the state
constitution was inapplicable. Id. at 290 (holding that the plaintiff-employee "has
failed to produce evidence that the [Alaska] voters who ratified Section 22
specifically intended that the privacy amendment should apply to private action.
Thus, the superior court did not err in its determination that state action is required
to assert a violation of a constitutional right to privacy.").
39 Id. at 290. In Miller, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "Safeway convincingly
[argued] that the citizens who ratified the amendment voted on a version of Section
22 that did not contain any specific language regarding penalties for private
action." Id.
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2 Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Alaska statutory law does not offer much protection from sophisticated
monitoring technology. Employers may audiotape employees without
gaining their consent, as Alaska law only requires one party to the
conversation to consent.4 0  The Alaska Supreme Court held that the
eavesdropping statute was "intended to prohibit third-party eavesdropping
and is therefore not applicable [to a participant in a conversation].AI It is a
crime in Alaska to view or produce a picture of a naked or partially naked
42person without consent. This might pose an issue to employers desiring to
record employee actions in restrooms or locker rooms in a theft
investigation, etc. However, "[i]n a prosecution under this section, it is an
affirmative defense that the viewing or photography was conducted as a
security surveillance system, notice of the viewing or photography was
posted, and any viewing or use of pictures produced is done only in the
interest of crime prevention or prosecution."43
3. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
The code does prohibit one form of employee monitoring using
sophisticated technology-the use of genetic testing on individuals without
"informed and written consent."" Finally, a new Alaska law protects
privacy in personally identifying information (PII) both inside and outside
of the workplace. The new Personal Information Protection Act requires
businesses to notify consumers when their P11 is accessed inappropriately,
allows individuals to place freezes on their credit reports and scores,
restricts the use of social security numbers and requires businesses to take
40 ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (2010).
41 Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1108 n.5 (Alaska 1979); see also THE
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, CAN WE TAPE? at Alaska (Fall
2008) [hereinafter CAN WE TAPE?] (citing Palmer, 604 P.2d 1106).
42 ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.123 (2010).
43 Id. § 11.61.123(d).
4 Id. § 18.13.010(a)(1)-(2). Stating that:
Except as provided ... (1) a person may not collect a DNA
sample from a person, perform a DNA analysis on a sample,
retain a DNA sample or the results of a DNA analysis, or
disclose the results of a DNA analysis unless the person has first
obtained the informed and written consent of the person, or the
person's legal guardian or authorized representative, for the
collection, analysis, retention, or disclosure; (2) a DNA sample
and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample are
the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.
Id.
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care to protect PII when disposing of records.45 These types of protections
of PII indicate that the Alaska state legislature is at least aware of the
invasiveness of contemporary technology. The next step in such protection
could encourage legislation designed to beef up privacy in the workplace.
C. Arizona
1. Constitutional Protection
Arizona's constitution states: "No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.'* 6 Similar to
Alaska-and nine of the ten state constitutions mentioned in this section-
this provision only applies to invasions of privacy by state actors. Arizona
courts have held that the provisions "was not intended to give rise to a
private cause of action between private individuals, but was intended as a
prohibition on the State and has the same effect as the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States."47 Backing up this idea is the
preamble to the Arizona Employment Protection Act, which "was intended
to eliminate judicial discretion in determining whether a plaintiff has
alleged a violation of public policy in a wrongful termination suit.',4 More
specifically, the Arizona legislature declared that "public policy is expressly
determined by the legislature in the form of statutory provisions [and that
the Arizona Constitution] did not intend to vest the courts with the authority
to establish ... the public policy of the state."49 This legislative intent
might skew future interpretations of Arizona's constitutional right to
privacy away from limiting monitoring as courts leave it to the legislature
to specifically protect employee privacy.
45 Id §§ 45.48.010-.995. The state also protects workers compensation records by
classifying them as not public. Id. § 23.30.107(b) (stating that, "[m]edical or
rehabilitation records, and the employee's name, address, social security number,
electronic mail address, and telephone number contained on any record, in an
employee's file maintained by the division or held by the board or the commission
are not public records subject to public inspection and copying").
46 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.
47 Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); see also
Amor v. Arizona, No. CIV 06-499-TUC-CKJ, 2009 WL 529326, at *93 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 27, 2009) (citing Cluff and holding that Arizona's constitutional right to
privacy was not "intended to give rise to a private cause of action between private
individuals. The court having found that [the doctor who was the defendant in the
case] is not a state actor, the court finds Amor has failed to state a claim against
[the defendant] under [the Arizona Constitution].").
48 Aaron C. Schepler, Note, Comments and Legislative Review: Hart v. Seven
Resorts, Inc.: Should the Arizona Constitution Protect Employees from Employer-
Mandated Drug Testing?, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 541, 555-56 (1998).
49 See 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 140, 1(A).
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2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Arizona law allows the interception of a wire or electronic conversation
of an individual as long as one party to the conversation consents.50
Employers may also intercept (i.e., eavesdrop upon) a non-electronic
conversation in all places where employees do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy." However, it is:
[U]nlawful for any person to knowingly photograph,
videotape, film, digitally record or by any other means
secretly view, with or without a device, another person
without that person's consent ... [i]n a restroom,
bathroom, locker room, bedroom or other location where
the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and the
person is urinating, defecating, dressing, undressing, nude
or involved in sexual intercourse or sexual contact ....
The law does not apply to "[p]hotographing, videotaping, filming or
digitally recording for security purposes if notice of the use ... is clearly
posted in the location and the location is one in which the person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy."5 3
3. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Arizona law bans smoking in the workplace but also prohibits
employers from retaliating or terminating an employee after discovering
that such employee smokes in places legally allowed by Arizona law. 54
Arizona law does marginally protect an individual's personal information.
The state code requires entities (including businesses) to redact or destroy
PII on records before discarding such records.55 Arizona businesses must
50 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005(A)(1) (2010) (stating that "[e]xcept as
provided ... a person is guilty of a class 5 felony who .. . [i]ntentionally intercepts
a wire or electronic communication to which he is not a party, or aids, authorizes,
employs, procures or permits another to so do, without the consent of either a
sender or receiver thereof.").
" Id. § 13-3001(8) (defining "oral communication" and allowing the monitoring of
oral communications unless the "spoken communication . .. is uttered by a person
who exhibits an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying the expectation [of privacy].").
52 Id. § 13-3019(A)(1).
" Id. § 13-3019(C)(1).
54 Id. § 36-601.01(B) (stating that smoking is allowed in Arizona in the places
specifically listed in the statute).
1 Id. § 44-7601(A) (stating that P11 consists of an individual's first and last name
or first initial and last name combined with an individual's complete: (1) Social
security number; (2) Credit card, charge card or debit card number; (3) Retirement
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also notify affected individuals when an internal investigation indicates that
their PI has been compromised.16  As stated above, protections of PII
indicate that the state legislature is at least aware of the invasiveness of
contemporary technology.
D. Arkansas
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Arkansas allows electronic or oral conversations to be recorded if the
person recording the conversation is a party to the conversation or if one
person to the conversation consents." Interestingly, Arkansas law states
that "[i]f any person without authority intercepts a dispatch or message
transmitted by telephone or willfully destroys or injures any telephone pole,
wire, cable, or fixture, he or she is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."5 s
This section likely prohibits employers from monitoring the telephone calls
of their employees. Arkansas also codified the crime of video voyeurism
stating that it:
[I]s unlawful to use any camera, videotape ... or any other
image recording device for the purpose of secretly
observing, viewing, photographing, filming, or videotaping
a person present in a residence, place of business, school,
or other structure, or any room or particular location within
that structure, if that person: is in a private area out of
public view; has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
has not consented to the observation. 9
There is an exception to the law if the security monitoring is "operated
by or at the direction of the owner or administrator of a place of
business . . . ."60 This should allow employers to record employees in
private areas of the workplace during internal security investigations.
E. California
1. Constitutional Protection
California's constitutional right to privacy is a different story entirely.
This provisions states that "[a]ll people are by nature free and independent
account number; (4) Savings, checking or securities entitlement account number; or
(5) Driver license number or non-operating identification license number).
" Id. § 44-7501.
1 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (2010).
" Id. § 23-17-107.
9Id. § 5-16-101(a).
60 Id. § 5-16-101(d)(3).
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and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."61  Unlike Alaska's
constitutional privacy protection, courts in California consistently hold that
this privacy provision does apply to private actors.62 To prevail in court
under the California constitutional right to privacy, an aggrieved individual
must:
1. Possess a legally protected privacy interest-which includes,
'conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or
interference' as determined by 'established social norms' derived
from such sources as the 'common law' and 'statutory
enactment' ;63
2. Possess a reasonable expectation of privacy-which rests on an
examination of 'customs, practices, and physical settings
surrounding particular activities,' as well as the opportunity to be
notified in advance and consent to the intrusion;"
3. Show that the intrusion is so serious in "nature, scope, and actual or
potential impact as to constitute an egregious breach of the social
norms" ;65 and
4. Be able to overcome the employer's defense that a less intrusive
means of monitoring was not available.66
2. Especially Relevant Case Law
Along these lines, this constitutional privacy protection is not unlimited
in favor of employees even in California. For example, the California
61 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
62 See, e.g., Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Butte Glenn Med. Soc'y, 557
F. Supp. 1190, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that "[i]n sum, the court finds that
California law supports the conclusion that Article I, § I was intended to provide
sweeping protection against interference with all personal privacy rights and that
such protection was meant to include protection against the acts of private
parties"); Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994)
(holding that "article I, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of
action against private as well as government entities. The legal concept of 'privacy'
as embodied in the [article] is susceptible of such an interpretation; the ballot
arguments strongly support it.").
63 Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (quoted in Hill,
865 P.2d at 654).
6 Id.
65 Id. (quoted in Hill, 865 P.2d at 655).
66 Id. (citing relevant precedent and stating that a "relevant inquiry in this regard is
whether the intrusion was limited, such that no confidential information was
gathered or disclosed.").
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Supreme Court recently held that employers may place hidden video
cameras in particular places for particular reasons and that not all
reasonable expectations of privacy are strong enough to completely ban
video monitoring on work premises.67  In Hernandez v. Hillsides, an
employer suspected that someone was sneaking into the offices of Hillsides
employees late at night to view pornography. 8 To catch the suspect in
violation of company policy, management installed a camera in an enclosed
office shared by two employees-neither of which was informed of the
monitoring or suspected of the violation.6 9  The camera only recorded
activity at night-when the suspected activity was taking place-and never
recorded either of the employees who worked in the office.70 Regardless,
when the employees discovered the monitoring, they sued Hillsides for,
71
among other things, violating their state constitutional right to privacy.
Hillsides argued that these employees suffered no privacy invasion because
they were never videotaped.72 On the contrary, the employees argued that
6 7See id. at 1082.61Id at 1066.
[T]he director of the facility, learned that late at night, after
plaintiffs had left the premises, an unknown person had
repeatedly used a computer in plaintiffs' office to access the
Internet and view pornographic Web sites. Such use conflicted
with company policy and with Hillsides's aim of providing a safe
haven for the children.
Id.
69Id. (stating that the director was "concerned that the culprit might be a staff
member who worked with the children."). With this in mind and "without
notifying plaintiffs, [the director] set up a hidden camera in their office." Id.
7 0 id.
The camera could be made operable from a remote location, at
any time of day or night, to permit either live viewing or
videotaping of activities around the targeted workstation. It is
undisputed that the camera was not operated for either of these
purposes during business hours, and, as a consequence, that
plaintiffs' activities in the office were not viewed or recorded by
means of the surveillance system. [The director] did not expect or
intend to catch plaintiffs on tape.
Id.
71 Id. ("[A]fter discovering the hidden camera in their office, plaintiffs filed this tort
action alleging, among other things, that defendants intruded into a protected place,
interest, or matter, and violated their right to privacy under both the common law
and the state Constitution.").
72 Id. at 1072. Stating that Hillsides argues:
[T]hat they did nothing wrong in attempting to videotape a
nighttime intruder using the computer in plaintiffs' office,
because no private information about plaintiffs was obtained.
Defendants insist that plaintiffs, not being the intended targets of
the surveillance plan, were never viewed or recorded, and thereby
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they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their closed office and that
the placement of the camera itself, with the ability to record them at any
time-constituted a privacy violation.13  The Court held that while the
employees did possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their enclosed
office, the video recording that took place in this case was neither highly
offensive nor an "egregious breach of the social norms."74 Therefore, the
monitoring did not violate the California Constitution.
The Hernandez case made it clear that video monitoring that captured
employees actually present in their enclosed offices would violate the
California Constitution. In fact, the California Supreme Court sympathized
with the plaintiff employees in the case by stating:
We appreciate plaintiffs' dismay over the discovery of
video equipment-small, blinking, and hot to the touch-
that their employer had hidden among their personal effects
in an office that was reasonably secluded from public
access and view. Nothing we say here is meant to
encourage such surveillance measures, particularly in the
absence of adequate notice to persons within camera range
that their actions may be viewed and taped.
suffered no serious or actionable intrusion into their private
domain.
Id.
7 Id. (stating that the employees insisted "that defendants were able to view and
record plaintiffs at will, without their knowledge or consent, and unjustifiably
deprived them of the privacy they reasonably expected to have while working
behind closed doors in their shared office.").
74 Id. at 1082. Holding that:
[C]onsidering all the relevant circumstances, plaintiffs have not
established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, that the
particular conduct of defendants that is challenged in this case
was highly offensive and constituted an egregious violation of
prevailing social norms. We reach this conclusion from the
standpoint of a reasonable person based on defendants' vigorous
efforts to avoid intruding on plaintiffs' visual privacy altogether.
Activation of the surveillance system was narrowly tailored in
place, time, and scope, and was prompted by legitimate business
concerns. Plaintiffs were not at risk of being monitored or
recorded during regular work hours and were never actually
caught on camera or videotape.
Id.
75 id.
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3. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Private employers will likely retain the ability to video specific places
in the workplace as long as the technology does not capture employees
conducting tasks. California requires that ALL parties to a telephonic or
wire communication consent to its interception and that all parties to a
confidential conversation consent to its recording. In fact, the California
legislature declared that:
[A]dvances in science and technology have led to the
development of new devices and techniques for the purpose
of eavesdropping upon private communications and that
the invasion of privacy resulting from the continual and
increasing use of such devices and techniques has created a
serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and
cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society. The
Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of
privacy of the people of this state.7 7
An employer need not disclose the contents of any intercepted or
recorded conversation to violate California's privacy laws.7 ' This would
lessen the effectiveness of monitoring employees at their homes or out on
the town. However, a California court has held that the communication
covered by this section of the penal code does not include covertly taken
76 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2010). Stating that a confidential
communication:
[I]ncludes any communication carried on in circumstances as
may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication
desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a
communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative,
judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the
public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the
communication may reasonably expect that the communication
may be overheard or recorded.
Id.
n Id. § 630.
78 See, e.g., Coulter v. Bank of Am., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
Stating that:
We address briefly the other specific points made by Coulter.
First, he suggests that because he never disclosed the tapes to any
third party, there was no violation of the Privacy Act. There is
no disclosure requirement. Section 632 [of the California Penal
Code] prohibits recording a confidential communication without
consent of all parties. It says nothing about publishing the
communication to a third party.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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video recordings or photographs because such interceptions are not
"communications."7 9
4. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
In California, employers cannot punish workers for lawful conduct that
occurs during non-working hours and away from the worksite.80 This is an
important distinction from most lifestyle discrimination statutes that merely
ban employees from discriminating against employees based on their use of
tobacco. California law also states that "[n]o employer shall coerce or
influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by
means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or
refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political
action or political activity."8'
California requires businesses collecting PII from California residents
to post a privacy policy on the homepage stating how they will collect and
use PII.82 California residents may request that companies to which they
submitted PII inform them of how their information was disclosed to third
7 See People v. Drennan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("We
conclude from the repeated use of words associated with sounds, symbols and
hearing that the recordings prohibited by this statute [California Penal Code section
632] are the recordings of the contents of audible or symbol-based
communications.").
80 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96(k), 98.6 (West 2010).
81 Id. § 1102 (West 2009).
82 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2009). Stating that the privacy
policy must:
(1) Identify the categories of personally identifiable information
that the operator collects through the Web site or online service
about individual consumers who use or visit its commercial Web
site or online service and the categories of third-party persons or
entities with whom the operator may share that personally
identifiable information; (2) If the operator maintains a process
for an individual consumer who uses or visits its commercial
Web site or online service to review and request changes to any
of his or her personally identifiable information that is collected
through the Web site or online service, provide a description of
that process; (3) Describe the process by which the operator
notifies consumers who use or visit its commercial Web site or
online service of material changes to the operator's privacy policy
for that Web site or online service; [and] (4) Identify its effective
date.
Id.
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parties. Consumers can become aware of their rights in this respect
because businesses are required to place a Privacy Policy link on their
homepage.84 Companies that conduct business in California and that collect
83 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2009). Stating that the categories of
personal information required to be disclosed pursuant to [this provision] are all of
the following:
(i) Name and address; (ii) Electronic mail address; (iii) Age or
date of birth; (iv) Names of children; (v) Electronic mail or other
addresses of children; (vi) Number of children; (vii) The age or
gender of children; (viii) Height; (ix) Weight; (x) Race;
(xi) Religion; (xii) Occupation; (xiii) Telephone number;
(xiv) Education; (xv) Political party affiliation; (xvi) Medical
condition; (xvii) Drugs, therapies, or medical products or
equipment used; (xviii) The kind of product the customer
purchased, leased, or rented; (xix) Real property purchased,
leased, or rented; (xx) The kind of service provided; (xxi) Social
security number; (xxii) Bank account number; (xxiii) Credit card
number; (xxiv) Debit card number; (xxv) Bank or investment
account, debit card, or credit card balance; (xxvi) Payment
history; [and] (xxvii) Information pertaining to the customer's
creditworthiness, assets, income, or liabilities.
Id.
84 Id. § 1798.83(b)(1)(B) . Stating that a business covered under this section must:
[A]dd to the home page of its Web site a link either to a page
titled "Your Privacy Rights" or add the words "Your Privacy
Rights" to the home page's link to the business's privacy policy.
If the business elects to add the words "Your Privacy Rights" to
the link to the business's privacy policy, the words "Your Privacy
Rights" shall be in the same style and size as the link to the
business's privacy policy. If the business does not display a link
to its privacy policy on the home page of its Web site, or does not
have a privacy policy, the words "Your Privacy Rights" shall be
written in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting
type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set
off from the surrounding text of the same size by symbols or
other marks that call attention to the language. The first page of
the link shall describe a customer's rights pursuant to this section
and shall provide the designated mailing address, e-mail address,
as required, or toll-free telephone number or facsimile number, as
appropriate. If the business elects to add the words "Your
California Privacy Rights" to the home page's link to the
business's privacy policy in a manner that complies with this
subdivision, and the first page of the link describes a customer's
rights pursuant to this section, and provides the designated
mailing address, electronic mailing address, as required, or toll-
free telephone or facsimile number, as appropriate, the business
need not respond to requests that are not received at one of the
designated addresses or numbers.
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PII must provide "reasonable security" for the information8 ' and notify
California residents when their P11 is compromised. Businesses must
also:
[T]ake all reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the
disposal, of customer records within its custody or control
containing personal information when the records are no
longer to be retained by the business by (a) shredding, (b)
erasing, or (c) otherwise modifying the personal
information in those records to make it unreadable or
undecipherable through any means.87
California law prohibits the use of RFID technology to read or attempt
to read an individual's identification documents.8 8 Legislation also states
that a person shall not require, coerce, or compel any other individual to
undergo the subcutaneous implanting of an identification device.
F. Colorado
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Colorado allows the recording or eavesdropping upon telephonic/
electronic communications and oral conversations as long as one party to
the conversation consents to the monitoring. 90 Colorado also criminalizes
any conspiracy to wiretap or eavesdrop in a manner inconsistent with the
code.91 However, Colorado law does not "prevent any person from using
Id
85 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West 2010) Defining P11 as:
an individual's first name or first initial and his or her last name
in combination with any one or more of the following data
elements, when either the name or the data elements are not
encrypted or redacted: (A) Social security number; (B) Driver's
license number or California identification card number;
(C) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that
would permit access to an individual's financial account; [and]
(D) Medical information.
Id.
California also protects an individual's Social Security Number (SSN) and Driver's
License Number (DLN) in areas such as distribution and retention; id § 1798.85
(discussing SSN); id. § 1798.90.1 (discussing DLN).
" See id. § 1798.82.
"See id. § 1798.81.
81See id § 1798.79.
8 See id.
90 See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-9-303 to 18-9-304 (2010).
9' See id. §§ 18-9-303(1)(f), 18-9-304(1)(d).
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wiretapping or eavesdropping devices on his own premises for security or
business purposes if reasonable notice of the use of such devices is given to
the public." This provision would allow employers to monitor their
employees as long as "reasonable notice" is provided.92  "Reasonable
notice" might encompass: (1) receiving notice within a reasonable time
prior to the monitoring; (2) reasonably clear and fair terms; or (3) both.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Colorado law prohibits employers from discriminating against or
otherwise coercing employees based on their political affiliations.93 More
specifically, American Jurisprudence stated that these types of prohibitions
can be defined as follows:
The test of whether an employer has violated the statutory
prohibition against interference with employees' protected
rights does not depend on an employer's motive, courtesy,
or gentleness, or on whether the interference, restraint, or
coercion succeeded or failed, but on whether an employer
engaged in conduct reasonably tending to interfere with the
free exercise of employee rights. Stated differently, the
issue is not the label placed on the employer's action, but
whether the action tends to coerce or not or, considered
from the employees' point of view, whether the action had
a reasonable tendency to coerce, and a union does not have
to demonstrate actual coercion.94
Colorado law prohibits termination:
[O]f any employee due to that employee's engaging in any
lawful activity off the premises of the employer during
nonworking hours unless such a restriction ... . relates to a
bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and
rationally related to the employment activities and
responsibilities of a particular employee ... [or is]
necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a
conflict of interest.95
9 2 See id. § 18-9-305(1).
93 See id. § 8-2-102.
9 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 1336 (2000).
9 CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2010).
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Finally, each state governmental entity in Colorado is required to create
and post privacy policies that deal with the collection, use, storage and
transfer of P1196 as well as create an e-mail monitoring policy.97
G. Connecticut
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Like California, Connecticut law requires the consent of all parties
before an oral telephonic conversation may be recorded.98 However, only
one party must consent to a recording in cases of wiretapping (or "the
intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic
communication or a communication made by cellular radio telephone by a
person other than a sender or receiver thereof. .. means of any instrument,
device or equipment.").99 The state code holds that a "person is guilty of
eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical
overhearing of a conversation." 00  State law forbids employers and
employees from intentionally overhearing or recording "a conversation or
discussion pertaining to employment contract negotiations between the two
parties, by means of any instrument, device or equipment, unless such party
has the consent of all parties to such conversation or discussion."' 0
In addition, the Code states that a
[P]erson is guilty of voyeurism when, (1) with malice, such
person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or
otherwise records the image of another person (A) without
96 See id. § 24-72-502.
9' See id. § 24-72-204.5 (stating that "[o]n or before July 1, 1997, the state or any
agency, institution, or political subdivision thereof that operates or maintains an
electronic mail communications system shall adopt a written policy on any
monitoring of electronic mail communications and the circumstances under which
it will be conducted.").
98 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d (2010). Stating that any recording must be:
(1) preceded by consent of all parties to the communication and
such prior consent either is obtained in writing or is part of, and
obtained at the start of, the recording, or (2) is preceded by verbal
notification which is recorded at the beginning and is part of the
communication by the recording party, or (3) is accompanied by
an automatic tone warning device which automatically produces
a distinct signal that is repeated at intervals of approximately
fifteen seconds during the communication while such instrument,
device or equipment is in use.
Id
99Id. § 53a-187.
'"Id. §53a-189.
' Id § 31-48b(d).
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the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while
such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under
circumstances where such other person has a reasonable
102
expectation of privacy ....
In addition, Connecticut state law forbids employers to operate
[A]ny electronic surveillance device or system, including
but not limited to the recording of sound or voice or a
closed circuit television system . .. for the purpose of
recording or monitoring the activities of his employees in
areas designed for the health or personal comfort of the
employees or for safeguarding of their possessions, such as
restrooms, locker rooms or lounges.103
The first two violations of this provision can lead to fines with
additional violations leading to up to thirty days imprisonment.1
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Connecticut is one of only two states that require employers to notify
their employees before implementing electronic monitoring.105  This
groundbreaking statute reads:
[E]ach employer who engages in any type of electronic
monitoring shall give prior written notice to all employees
who may be affected, informing them of the types of
monitoring which may occur. Each employer shall post, in
a conspicuous place which is readily available for viewing
by its employees, a notice concerning the types of
electronic monitoring which the employer may engage in.
Such posting shall constitute such prior written notice. 106
This notice requirement does not apply when "an employer has
reasonable grounds to believe that employees are engaged in conduct which
(i) violates the law, (ii) violates the legal rights of the employer or the
employer's employees, or (iii) creates a hostile workplace environment, and
(B) electronic monitoring may produce evidence of this misconduct."'
0 7
These provisions do not apply when the employee is under a criminal
investigation. 0 8 Violations of this provision lead to investigations by the
'
02 Id. § 53a-189a.
03 Id § 31-48b(b).
'0 See id § 31-48b(c).
'
0 See id § 31-48d.06 Id. § 31-48d(b)(1).
107 Id. § 31-48d(2)(A)(B).
"o See id § 31-48d(d).
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Connecticut Labor Commissioner; after such investigations, the
Commissioner may levy fines which increase as the number of violations
increases.109
Connecticut has enacted a lifestyle discrimination statute that prohibits
employers from disciplining or discharging employees:
[O]n account of the exercise by such employee of rights
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the
Constitution of the state,"o provided such activity does not
substantially or materially interfere with the employee's
bona fide job performance or the working relationship
between the employee and the employer."'
Connecticut law also prohibits employers from conditioning
employment upon or in any way discriminating against an employee
because of lawful use of tobacco products outside of the workplace.l12
Finally, businesses must create and post a privacy policy if they collect
Social Security Numbers in the course of business." 3 Finally, Connecticut
requires an employee's consent before an employer may release a personnel
file to a third party.114
H. Delaware
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Delaware law states that no individual shall "[i]ntentionally intercept,
endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept any wire, oral or electronic communication.""s It is lawful,
however, for "a person to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication
109 See id § 31-48d(c).
no The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all United
States citizens in their rights to freedom: (1) of speech, (2) of religion (allowing for
free exercise and prohibiting the establishment of religion), (3) of the press, (4) of
assembly, and (5) to petition the government for the redress of grievances. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. I. These sections mentioned in this statute protect all
Connecticut citizens in their rights to religious profession and worship, freedom of
speech and to petition the government for the redress of their grievances. See
CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4, 14.
"' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2010).
112 See id. § 31-40s (stating that any "nonprofit organization or corporation whose
primary purpose is to discourage use of tobacco products by the general public
shall be exempt from the provisions of this section.").
"
3 See id. § 42-471(b).
114 See id § 31-128f.
" See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(a)(1) (2010).
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where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception."" 6
The law seemingly conflicts with Delaware's privacy law which states that:
A person is guilty of a violation of privacy when .. . the person:
1. Trespasses on property intending to subject anyone to
eavesdropping or other surveillance in a private place; or
2. Installs in any private place, without consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing,
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or
events in that place; or
3. Installs or uses outside a private place any device for hearing,
recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds originating in that
place which would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible
outside, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to
privacy there; or
4. Intercepts without the consent of all parties thereto a message by
telephone, telegraph, letter or other means of communicating
privately, including private conversation. 17
This conflict made its way to the Delaware courts where one opinion
held that Delaware law regarding interception was intended to mirror
federal law where only one party to a conversation need consent."' Also,
the Delaware Electronic Surveillance and Interception of Communications
Statute"9 is much more recent than the Delaware Privacy Statute.12 It is
reasonable to assume that the state legislature knew of the consent
provisions on the Privacy Act when it allowed for only one person to
consent to wiretapping. Finally, the privacy statute prohibits anyone from
making "tape records, photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise
[reproducing] the image of another person" who disrobes in private places
where such person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.121 By its terms,
this provision would likely not prohibit an employer placing a video camera
in an employee break room where disrobing-hopefully-is uncommon. It
would likely prohibit cameras in restrooms, employee locker rooms and in
offices where employees may change clothes.
116 Id. § 2402(c)(4).
"
7 Id. § 1335(a)(1)-(4).
118 United States v. Vespe, 389 F. Supp. 1359, 1372 (D. Del. 1975).
119 See 72 Del. Laws 391 (1999).
120 Enacted in 1953. See 58 Del. Laws 497 (1999); 67 Del. Laws 130 (1999); 70
Del. Laws 186 (1953); see also CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Del. (stating that
the "wiretapping law is much more recent, and at least one federal court has held
that, even under the privacy law, an individual can record his own conversations.").
121 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(6) (2010).
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2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Delaware is also on the front lines in the battle of employee notice of
electronic monitoring. Delaware's Labor Code states that employers may
not:
[M]onitor or otherwise intercept any telephone
conversation or transmission, electronic mail or
transmission, or Internet access or usage of or by a
Delaware employee unless the employer either:
1. Provides an electronic notice of such monitoring or
intercepting policies or activities to the employee
at least once during each day the employee
accesses the employer-provided e-mail or Internet
access services; or
2. Has first given a [one time] notice to the employee
of such monitoring or intercepting activity or
policies. The notice required by this paragraph
shall be in writing, in an electronic record, or in
another electronic form and acknowledged by the
employee either in writing or electronically.122
Problematically, the law only allows for a $100 fine per violation.123
These fines could add up, however, due to the statute's daily notice
requirement. And, employees are allowed to pursue other remedies-
including an invasion of privacy tort lawsuit.124 Finally, state agencies that
maintain a website are required to develop a privacy policy dictating how
they deal with personal information.125
I. Florida
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
Florida's Constitution provides its citizens with a right to privacy.126
Article I, section 12 states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
122 Id. at tit. 19, § 705(b)(l)-(2). "The provisions of this section shall not apply to
processes that are designed to manage the type or volume of incoming or outgoing
electronic mail or telephone voice mail or Internet usage, that are not targeted to
monitor or intercept the electronic mail or telephone voice mail or Internet usage of
a particular individual, and that are performed solely for the purpose of computer
system maintenance and/or protection." Id. § 705(e).
1 Id. § 705(c).
124 Id. § 705(d).
125 Id. at tit. 29, § 9018C.
126 FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 23.
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seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated."1 2 7 The "interception
of private communications" clause is an addition to the language that was
otherwise derived from the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 128 And, like the Fourth Amendment, Florida's clause only
applies to invasions of privacy by state actors. 12 9 Article I, § 23 of the
Florida Constitution states that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life
except as otherwise provided herein.",30 By its own terms, § 23 is limited
to state action that violates an individual's privacy. Additionally, Florida's
privacy provision "has not been given the power that was intended when it
was adopted in 1980."..
2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Florida is one of the few states that requires that all parties consent to
any recording of an oral, wire, or electronic communication. 132 "Under the
[Florida Security of Communications Act] statute, consent is not required
for the taping of a non-electronic communication uttered by a person who
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
127 Id. § 12.
128 Id.; U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
129 See, e.g., State v. Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181, 183 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(discussing, among other things, Article 1, Section 12 and stating that "[s]ince it
was not made an issue in the trial court, the state has conceded for purposes of this
appeal that Officer Nieto's activities at all relevant times constituted state action.");
see also State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (questioned
by a later case on other grounds). Stating that:
Although presumably Article I, Section 12 [of the Florida
Constitution], applies only to state action as distinguished from
private action, the argument could be made that Dr. Feegel's
action in recording his first telephone conversation with Dr.
Tsavaris was state action in view of the fact that Dr. Feegel held
the office of medical examiner pursuant to Florida law and was
acting in that capacity at the time. In our view, participant
recording of a conversation is not an interception of a private
communication. Therefore, Article I, Section 12, is not
applicable.
Id.
130 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
'1 Deborah Lynn Stewart, Note and Comment, City of North Miami v. Kurtz-Is It
Curtains for Privacy In Florida?, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1393, 1399 (Spring 1996)
(citing other sources and stating that "[i]t has been observed that 'all too often
privacy plays second banana to competing interests,' even though the purpose of
this provision was to provide more protection").
132 FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (2010).
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communication."13 3 This all-parties consent provision was added to the
Florida law in 1974 via an amendment. 134 This amendment:
[W]as a policy decision by the Florida legislature to allow
each party to a conversation to have an expectation of
privacy from interception by another party to the
conversation .... Hence, the Florida act evinces a greater
concern for the protection of one's privacy interests in a
conversation than does the federal act.135
However, Florida courts have held that businesses are allowed to record
telephone calls without the consent of all parties.136 The court held that the
Florida Security of Communications law was intended to resemble the
Federal Wiretap Act,137 which only requires one party to a conversation to
consent when such recording is made in the ordinary course of business.13 8
At the end of the day, Florida employers are wise to consult counsel before
wading through these provisions.
1 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Fla. (citing the definition of "oral
communication" in FLA. STAT. § 934.02 (2010)).
134 Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d at 422 n.5.
"' Id. at 422 (citing Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723, 726-27
(Fla. 1977)).
136 Royal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 215,
219 (11th Cir. 1991). Holding that:
Florida does indeed have a two-party consent rule. But we
disagree with Royal Health's contention that all federal case law
dealing with the Federal Wiretap Act is inapposite. The
Historical Note that follows the legislative findings section of the
Act indicates that, with one exception the [Florida] state law
follows closely the federal act.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
37 Id. The Federal Wire Act reads, in the relevant part:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of any State.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2010).
138 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
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J. Georgia
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
When it comes to the interception of communications, Georgia law is a
bit complicated. The law requires the consent of both parties before any
private conversation may be overheard, transmitted or recorded.'"9 For
interceptions to be illegal, they must be made in a clandestine manner and
must originate in a private place.14 0 Georgia law also prohibits any person
from "intentionally and secretly [intercepting] by the use of any device,
instrument, or apparatus the contents of a message sent by telephone,
telegraph, letter, or by any other means of private communication.,"l4'
However, a specific exception exists which allows "a person [to intercept] a
wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception."l42 Therefore, employers can record their
employees as long as they are a party to the communication but not when
the employer is not a party to a private conversation made in a private
place.
Finally, it is unlawful for anyone "through the use of any device ... to
observe, photograph, or record the activities of another which occur in any
private place and out of public view" without the consent of all parties
involved.14 3 As stated earlier, there are few places in the workplace that are
considered truly private. This state law would not apply to surveillance in
public areas of the workplace.
K. Hawaii
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
Hawaii's Constitution provides for a right to privacy. Article I, section
6 states that "[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The
legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."'" Section 7
of article I states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures and invasions ofprivacy shall not be violated; and
'3 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2010).
0 Id. § 16-11-62(1).
14 1 Id. § 16-11-62(4).
142 Id. § 16-11-66(a).
143 Id. § 16-11-62(2).
4 HAW. CONST. art I, § 6.
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no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the
communications sought to be intercepted. 14 5
These sections have been held to apply only to invasions of privacy
committed by state actors. 14 6
2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Hawaii, an interception of an oral, wire or electronic communication
is valid as long as one party to the communication intercepts or as long as
one party to the communication consents to the interception.147 Such
interceptions are valid as long as no criminal or tortious intent exists. 14 8
Hawaii law does not allow people to place recording devices in private
places.14 9 Any installation or use in a private place and without consent of
any device capable of observing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting a
person in a state of undress constitutes a violation of privacy in the first
degree.s 0 More applicable to the employment environment, a violation of
privacy in the second degree occurs when a person:
(d) Installs or uses, or both, in any private place,
without consent of the person or persons entitled to
145 Id. § 7 (emphasis added).
146 See, e.g., State v. Mallan, 950 P.2d 178, 184 (Haw. 1998) (stating that article I,
§ 6 of the Hawaii Constitution should be interpreted under the rational basis to
strict scrutiny tests adopted by the United States Supreme Court to determine the
invasiveness of state action). The dissent in the same opinion stated that "article I,
section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution ... which has given an express and expansive
local home to the proposition . .. that 'the right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest."' Id. at 193 (Levinson, J., dissenting). The same holds true for article I, §
7; for example:
The right-to-privacy provisions in article I, section 6 and article I,
section 7 [of the Hawaii Constitution] are distinct. As the final
interpreter of the Hawaii Constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court
has so held .. .. This history also makes it clear that the right to
privacy protected by article I, section 7 is not in the nature of a
fundamental right. Rather, its application is limited to criminal
cases and is to be construed in light of the language [of the
United States Supreme Court] regarding reasonable expectations
of privacy.
State v. Okuba, 651 P.2d 494, 500 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982).
147 HAw. REv. STAT. § 803-42(b)(3)(A) (2010).
148 id
149 Id. § 711-1110.9.
15o Id. (stating that the consent must come from the person who holds the right to
privacy in the private place).
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privacy therein, any means or device for observing,
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or
events in that place, including another person in a
stage of undress or sexual activity;
(e) Installs or uses outside a private place any device
for hearing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting
sounds originating in that place which would not
ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside,
without the consent of the person or persons
entitled to privacy therein; [or, for purposes of this
discussion] ... ;
(g) Intercepts, without the consent of the sender or
receiver, a message or photographic image by
telephone, telegraph, letter, electronic transmission,
or other means of communicating privately.' 5
For obvious reasons, it is more likely that an employer would find itself
in hot water for a violation of privacy in the second degree. Violations in
the first degree require employers to surveil in areas that they know are
private-such as locker rooms, restrooms, etc.-where employees are
likely to be in any "stage of undress." Second degree privacy invasions
might apply to surveillance inside or just outside of employee offices or
communications such as e-mails that employees consider private.
L. Idaho
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Idaho, "[a]lthough legislation criminalizes the interception and
disclosure of wire, [electronic,] or oral communications, it specifically
allows interception when one of the parties [to the communication] has
given prior consent."l 5 2 Idaho law states that a crime is committed with a
willful interception, an attempt to intercept, or an arrangement to intercept
or attempt to intercept a communication without the necessary consent
covered under the statute.15 3
:'2' ld. § 711 -1111 (1)(d), (e), (g).
152 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Idaho (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702
(2010)).
153 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702(1) (2010).
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M. Illinois
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
The Illinois Constitution protects an Illinois citizen's right to privacy.
Article I, § 6 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he people shall have the right
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means."'s Article I, §
12, of the state constitution declares that "[e]very person shall find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his
person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law,
freely, completely, and promptly."' 56 Section 6 only applies to invasions of
privacy and interceptions of communications caused by state action.1 7
Section 12, on the other hand, has been held to apply to private entities as
well as state action.1 8 The Illinois Supreme Court held that:
Consistent with this court's [prior holding] we recognize
that section 12 of the Illinois Constitution, unlike section 6,
does not require state action before its protections are
activated. However, the precise nature and scope of the
privacy interest set forth in section 12 has not been the
subject of much case law in this state. s9
The court continued on to state that "[w]e do not, however, create a broad-
based remedy for perceived violations of a person's privacy interests by
private parties. Instead, we focus narrowly on the constitutional source of
the privacy interest that can be deemed a part of the public policy of this
state."l 6 0 In other words, § 12 does not create a private right of action for
invasions of privacy; rather, the section "simply expresses a public policy
philosophy with which Illinois statutes must comply."' 6 '
154 ILL. CONST. art I, §§ 6, 12.
15Id. § 6 (emphasis added).56 Id. § 12 (emphasis added).
1s7 Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1097 (Ill. 1997) (citing
precedent and stating that "[t]his court has stated that governmental conduct or
'state action' must be present before a citizen claiming a violation of the privacy
right referenced in section 6 of the Illinois Bill of Rights may obtain relief.").
15s id.
'59 id.
16o Id. at 1100 n.13.
161 Belleville v. Cottrell, Inc., No. 09-CV-962-JPG, 2010 WL 1251442, at *4 (S.D.
Ill. Mar. 24, 2010) (construing Best, 689 N.E.2d 1057).
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2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Furthermore, Illinois law requires the consent of all parties to authorize
any intentional and knowing use of "an eavesdropping device for the
purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation" or the
interception, retention or transcription of an electronic communication. 62
Illinois law states that it is not unlawful for "a provider of wire or electronic
communication services, their agents, employees, contractors, or venders
to ... possess an eavesdropping device within the normal course of their
business for purposes not contrary to this Article."l63 The statute also
provides an affirmative defense for individuals who illegally intercept
communications as long as such individuals do not disclose the contents of
the communication they obtain.'64 "An eavesdropping device is any device
capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation or intercept,
retain, or transcribe electronic communications whether such conversation
or electronic communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by
any other means... ."l65 This definition is important because it
criminalizes the interception of an in-person communication as well a$ an
electronic communication. Also, Illinois law states that "[i]t is unlawful for,
any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of
another person without that person's consent in a restroom, tanning bed,
tanning salon, locker room, changing room, or hotel bedroom."' 6 6
Although sound recording is not covered under this section, employers
would be prohibited from placing video cameras in private places on the
worksite.167
3. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Illinois law also contains the Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act
(RPWA). The RPWA states that "it shall be unlawful for an employer to
162 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
163 Id. at 5/14-2(c).
'64 Id. at 5/14-2(b)(4).
161 Id. at 5/14-1(a). Stating also that:
[T]he term electronic communication means any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, pager,
computer, electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical
system, where the sending and receiving parties intend the
electronic communication to be private and the interception,
recording, or transcription of the electronic communication is
accomplished by a device in a surreptitious manner contrary to
the provisions of this Article.
Id. at 5/14-1(e).
6 Id. at 5/26-4(a).
161 Id. at 5/26-4(c).
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refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise disadvantage any
individual, with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because the individual uses lawful products off the premises of
the employer during nonworking hours."16 ' The State of Illinois has also
created an Internet Privacy Task Force-a seventeen-member body tasked
to:
Explore the technical and procedural changes that are
needed in the State's computing environment to ensure that
visits to State Web sites remain private. The Task Force
shall identify the threats to privacy from browsers, search
engines, Web servers, Internet service providers, and State
agencies and make recommendations as needed. If needed,
the Task Force shall devise procedures for creating or
installing computer programs on State host computers that
will disable cookies and other invasive programs. 169
Illinois state agencies are not allowed to "use permanent cookies or any
other invasive tracking programs that monitor and track Web site viewing
habits."e70 However, state agency Web sites "may use transactional cookies
that facilitate business transactions."' Each state agency in Illinois is
required to produce an "identity-protection policy" that deals with the use
and handling of social security numbers.17 2
N. Indiana
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Before a third party may intercept an electronic communication,
Indiana law requires the consent of either the sender or receiver. 173 The
sender or receiver of the communication itself may record without the
168 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5(a) (2010).
169 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 177/15(b) (2010).
17o Id. at 177/10(a). The statute states:
Permanent cookies used by State agency Web sites may be
exempt from the prohibition in subsection (a) if they meet the
following criteria: (1) The use of permanent cookies adds value
to the user otherwise not available; (2) The permanent cookies
are not used to monitor and track web site viewing habits unless
all types of information collected and the State's use of that
information add user value and are disclosed through a
comprehensive online privacy statement.
Id. at 177/10(b)(1)-(2).
' Id. at 177/10(a).
Id. at 179/37.
'7 IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1-5 (2010).
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consent of the other party. 174An "[e]lectronic communication' means any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, oral
communication, digital information, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, a radio, or an electromagnetic, a
photoelectronic, or a photo-optical system."'15
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Employers in Indiana may not "require . .. an employee or prospective
employee to refrain from using; or discriminate against an
employee . .. based on the employee's use of; tobacco products outside the
course of the employee's or prospective employee's employment."17 6
Interestingly, the state code allows employers to use financial incentives
which are "intended to reduce tobacco use" as long as such benefits are
"related to employee health benefits provided by the employer."' 77
0. Iowa
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Iowa law has an interesting twist on the one-party consent provisions of
other states. The state code allows the sender or the receiver of a
communication (or someone present and participating in or listening to a
communication) to consent to its interception. 178 Otherwise:
Any person, having no right or authority to do so, who taps
into or connects a listening or recording device to any
telephone or other communication wire, or who by any
electronic or mechanical means listens to, records, or
otherwise intercepts a conversation or communication of
any kind, commits a serious misdemeanor .. . .9
Another provision of Iowa law states that one party to a communication
may consent to the willful interception or a wire, oral, or electronic
communication.180 This potential conflict between statutory provisions has
reared its head in at least one case.'"' An employee of the Franklin County
Clerk's Office-distraught at her relationships between her and her co-
workers-secretly tape-recorded conversations from her desk throughout
174 id
17s Id. § 35-33.5-1-3.5.
'
76 Id. § 22-5-4-1.
177 id
178 IOWA CODE § 727.8 (2010).
79 Id.
'o Id. § 808B.2 (2010).
1 See, e.g., State v. Philpott, 702 N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 2005).
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the work day.182 The employee was charged under Iowa Code § 727.8
rather than § 808B.2.'" The district court spent a large part of the opinion
discussing the interplay between the two interception statutes.'8
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
The Iowa Fair Information Practices Act requires state agencies to
create information policies that detail, among other things:
1. The nature and extent of the personally identifiable
information collected by the agency, the legal
authority for the collection of that information, and
a description of the means of storage.
2. The procedures by which the agency shall notify
persons supplying information requested by the
agency of the use that will be made of the
information, which persons outside of the agency
might routinely be provided this information,
which parts of the information requested are
required and which are optional and the
consequences of failing to provide the information
requested.
3. Whether a data processing system matches,
collates, or permits the comparison of personally
identifiable information in one record system with
personally identifiable information in another
record system. 8 1
P. Kansas
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Kansas' state code contains a section titled "Breach of Privacy."' 86
Under Kansas law, "[i]ntercepting, without the consent of the sender or
receiver, a message by telephone, telegraph, letter or other means of private
communication" is a Class A misdemeanor.'87  This provision places
Kansas with the other states that allow interceptions of communications as
182 Id. at 502.
183 Id., see also State v. Philpott, No. 04-0060, 2005 WL 156824, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2005).
* Philpott, 2005 WL 156824, at *2; see also State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831
(Iowa 1992) (discussing the interplay between the two statutes).
185 IOWA CODE § 22.11(1)(a), (f), (g) (2010).
186 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4002 (2009).87 Id. § 21-4002(1).
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long as one party to the communication consents. The state also prohibits
eavesdropping which is defined as:
1. [E]ntering into a private place with intent to listen
surreptitiously to private conversations or to
observe the personal conduct of any other person
or persons therein;
2. [I]nstalling or using outside a private place any
device for hearing, recording, amplifying or
broadcasting sounds originating in such place,
which sounds would not ordinarily be audible or
comprehensible outside, without the consent of the
person or persons entitled to privacy therein;
3. [I]nstalling or using any device or equipment for
the interception of any telephone, .telegraph or
other wire communication without the consent of
the person in possession or control of the facilities
for such wire communication; or
4. [I]nstalling or using a concealed camcorder,
motion picture camera or photographic camera of
any type, to secretly videotape, film, photograph or
record by electronic means, another, identifiable
person under or through the clothing being worn by
that other person or another, identifiable person
who is nude or in a state of undress, for the purpose
of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn
by, that other person, without the consent or
knowledge of that other person, with the intent to
invade the privacy of that other person, under
circumstances in which the other person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.188
A private place under the law is defined as "a place where one may
reasonably expect to be safe from uninvited intrusion or surveillance, but
does not include a place to which the public has lawful access." 89 There is
the potential for an eavesdropping employer to be charged under both the
Breach of Privacy Statute and the eavesdropping statute. In addition, the
Kansas Supreme Court "has interpreted the eavesdropping and privacy
statutes to allow one-party consent for taping of conversations and in
interpreting both statutes has held that as long as one party consents to the
conversation, the other party loses his right to challenge the eavesdropping
in court."190 Finally, the Kansas eavesdropping statute would prevent
...See id. § 21-4001.
89 Id. § 21-4001(b).
o9 0 See CAN WE TAPE? supra note 41, at Kan. (citing State v. Roudybush, 686 P.2d
100, 109 (Kan. 1984)).
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employers from secretly recording employees in private places, such as
locker rooms or restrooms and perhaps even employee offices.
Q. Kentucky
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Kentucky, it is a Class D felony when a person "intentionally uses
any device to eavesdrop, whether or not he is present at the time." 9' The
state code states that to eavesdrop "means to overhear, record, amplify or
transmit any part of a wire or oral communication of others without the
consent of at least one (1) party thereto by means of any electronic,
mechanical or other device."' 92 It does not matter when the interception
device is placed as long as it is placed "with the knowledge that it is to be
used for eavesdropping."' 9 3 A person is not guilty of eavesdropping if she
"[i]nadvertently overhears the communication through a regularly installed
telephone party line or on a telephone extension but does not divulge it."' 94
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
It is unlawful in Kentucky:
To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment . .. because the individual is a smoker or
nonsmoker, as long as the person complies with any
workplace policy concerning smoking.'95
In addition, employers cannot "require as a condition of employment
that any employee or applicant for employment abstain from smoking or
using tobacco products outside the course of employment, as long as the
person complies with any workplace policy concerning smoking."' 96
' KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 526.020(1) (West 2009).
192 Id. § 526.010.
'9Id. § 526.030(1).
'9Id. § 526.070(1).
'
9 Id. § 344.040(1).
19 6 Id. § 344.040(3).
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R. Louisiana
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution is entitled "Right to
Privacy." 97 This provision states:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.
No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the
lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its
illegality in the appropriate court.'98
As with other state constitutional privacy protections, Louisiana's
Article I, § 5 only applies to state action.199 The Louisiana Supreme Court
"concluded that an individual is entitled to recover money damages for any
injury he has suffered as a result of a state agent's violation of Article I, § 5
of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution."2 00
2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Only one party must consent to the interception of a wire, oral or
electronic communication in Louisiana.2 0 1 This is not true if the
intercepting party has a criminal or tortious intent or intercepts the
communication "for the purpose of committing any other injurious act., 2 02
Louisiana has adopted a lifestyle discrimination statute that protects
employees who smoke tobacco while off-duty.203 This statute states that
employees who comply with "applicable law and any adopted workplace
policy regulating smoking" are protected.2 In fact:
[I]t shall be unlawful for an employer: (1) To discriminate
against the individual with respect to discharge,
compensation, promotion, any personnel action or other
condition, or privilege of employment because the
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
198 Id. (emphasis added).
199 See Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990).200 Id. (emphasis added).
201 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (2010).2 02 Id. § 15:1303(c)(4).
203 See id. § 23:966.
0 Id. § 23:966(A).
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individual is a smoker or nonsmoker [and] (2) To require,
as a condition of employment, that the individual abstain
from smoking or otherwise using tobacco products outside
the course of employment.20 5
Louisiana law also criminalizes video voyeurism as follows:
1. The use of any camera, videotape, photo-optical,
photo-electric, or any other image recording device
for the purpose of observing, viewing,
photographing, filming, or videotaping a person
where that person has not consented to the
observing, viewing, photographing, filming, or
videotaping and it is for a lewd or lascivious
purpose; or
2. The transfer of an image obtained by activity
described in Paragraph (1) of this Subsection by
live or recorded telephone message, electronic
mail, the Internet, or a commercial online
-206
service.
3. Especially Relevant Case Law
A Louisiana court recently dealt with video monitoring of employees.
In one of the state's most prominent monitoring cases, a security officer
working for a private employer (Wal-Mart) allegedly violated the privacy
rights of forty-five employees when he installed a video camera in a unisex
restroom.2 07  This was done without the permission of Wal-Mart
management.208 Suspecting theft by the night crew, the security officer
placed a remote-controlled camera in the ceiling tile of the employee
restroom. 209 The idea was to record action at the doorway to discover
whether employees were entering the restroom with merchandise.21 0 The
205 Id. § 23:966(A)(1)-(2).206Id. § 14:283(A)(1)-(2).
207 See Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 692 So. 2d 544, 545 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
208 See id at 546-47.
209 See id at 546. Stating that the security officer:
[H]ad reason to believe that a member of the night receiving
crew was stealing merchandise from the store by taking it to
either the break room or the employee restroom, removing the
item from its packaging, and concealing the pilfered item under
his/her clothing. Feeling the restroom was the most likely place
of occurrence of the suspected offenses, [the officer] decided to
[conceal] a closed circuit television camera in the ceiling of the
employee restroom in an attempt to apprehend the suspect.
Id
210 Id
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camera was discovered by a female employee who was using the restroom
as it slipped through the tile into plain view.2 11 In the end, the receiver was
never connected to the recording device and no footage was recorded.2 12
The security officer was terminated and Wal-Mart concluded an internal
investigation; the forty-five employees who claimed that they had used the
restroom during the time that the camera was installed were unsatisfied
with the process and filed a lawsuit.2 13 The court sided with Wal-Mart
holding that, at most, the company committed an attempted invasion of
privacy-an action that is not a recognized tort.214 The employees' ECPA
claim was also dismissed considering that:
Not only was there no interception of any electronic
transmission, but the [ECPA] limits recovery to 'any
persons whose wire, aural or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used.. . the
plaintiffs neither initiated nor engaged in any
communication of any sort. The conduct, of which they
complain simply, does not fit the conduct proscribed by the
statute."2 15
For some reason, the plaintiffs in the case brought suit under the
Federal ECPA rather than Louisiana's wiretapping statute. The same result
may have resulted or the court may have determined that the employer
(through its agent) had tortious intent (invasion of privacy) in making the
interception.
4. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Louisiana has a strong employee protection law when it comes to an
individual's political activities. The state code dictates that:
[N]o employer having regularly in his employ twenty or
more employees shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule,
regulation, or policy forbidding or preventing any of his
employees from engaging or participating in politics, or
from becoming a candidate for public office. No such
211 See id.
212 See id. (stating that the security officer admitted he had "placed the camera in
the restroom ceiling and explained his motive was to attempt to catch a thief. He
maintained that the receiver had never been connected to either a monitor or a VCR
and that neither he nor anyone else had viewed or taped anyone in the restroom.").
213 See id. at 547.
214 See id at 547 (holding that "[a]t best, we consider the facts herein to have
established an attempted invasion of privacy. However, since we know of no such
tort, we find we have no choice but to find there was no clear error committed by
the trial judge [in ruling for Wal-Mart].").
215 id
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employer shall adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or
policy which will control, direct, or tend to control or direct
the political activities or affiliations of his employees, nor
coerce or influence, or attempt to coerce or influence any
of his employees by means of threats of discharge or of
loss of employment in case such employees should support
or become affiliated with any particular political faction or
organization, or participate in political activities of any
nature or character.2 16
Violations of this statute may result in a fine or imprisonment, or
both.217 Employees injured in this manner may also sue to recover in a civil
action against their employer.218
S. Maine
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Maine allows one party to an oral or wire communication the authority
to make an interception of such communication.2 19 State law defines the
term "intercept" to mean:
[T]o hear, record or aid another to hear or record the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use
of any intercepting device by any person other than: (A)
The sender or receiver of that communication; (B) A
person within the range of normal unaided hearing or
subnormal hearing corrected to not better than normal; or
(C) A person given prior authority by the sender or
receiver.220
In fact, most individuals in Maine are prohibited from possessing or
selling interception-capable devices.2 21 Maine law bans hidden cameras
and other recording devices inside "private places."222 The same statute
bans listening devices outside of private places which are able to record
sounds that would not otherwise be audible.223 The term "private place"
216 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (2010).
217 Id.
218 d
219 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 710 (2010).
22 0 Id. § 709(4).
221 See id. § 709(5)-(6).
222 Id. at tit. 17-A, § 511 (1)(B) (stating that a person is guilty of invasion of privacy
if he or she "[i]nstalls or uses in a private place without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, photographing,
recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in that place.").
223See id. § 511(1)(C).
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means "a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from
surveillance, including, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms,
bathrooms and similar places."22 4
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
In accordance with many other states, Maine law prohibits employers
from discriminating against their employees based on the latter's use of
tobacco. The law states that:
An employer or an agent of an employer may not require,
as a condition of employment, that any employee or
prospective employee refrain from using tobacco products
outside the course of that employment or otherwise
discriminate against any person with respect to the person's
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment for using tobacco products outside the course
of employment as long as the employee complies with any
workplace policy concerning use of tobacco.225
T. Maryland
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Maryland is one of the few states that requires all parties to consent to
226the interception of an oral, electronic, or wire communication. More
specifically, Maryland law states that it is lawful:
[F]or a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where the person is a party to the
communication and where all of the parties to the
communication have given prior consent to the interception
unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of this State.227
This specificity is rather unique in the fact that, even if all parties
consent to the interception, at least one of the consenting parties must also
be a party to the conversation. This would prevent an employer from
monitoring an employee's conversation with a third party unrelated to the
224 Id. § 511(2).
225 Id. at tit. 26, § 597.226 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2010).
227 id.
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employer. Violations of this statute are felonies punishable by
imprisonment of up to five years, a $10,000 fine or both.228
In addition, it is unlawful in Maryland to use a hidden recording device
or an individual's eyes to peer into a "private place" without the consent of
the individual being viewed. 22 9 "Private place" in section 93-901 of the
Maryland Criminal Code is confined by its definition as a dressing room or
a rest room in a retail store.230 The code authorizes a civil action against the
perpetrator of the surveillance and also states that it is "not a defense to a
prosecution under this section that the defendant owns the premises where
the private place is located." 2 3 1 Maryland law also criminalizes visual
surveillance with prurient (sexual) intent.232  This is not as likely
(hopefully) to arise in the context of employee monitoring. Under this
section of the Criminal Code a "private place" is defined more loosely as "a
room in which a person can reasonably be expected to fully or partially
disrobe and has a reasonable expectation of privacy." 23 3 An expectation
exists allowing surveillance without prurient intent by a person who
conducts such visual surveillance to protect property.234
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Maryland law also prohibits individuals and businesses from requiring
the use of SSNs or transmitting SSNs over the Internet (unless the
connection is secure or the SSN is encrypted).2 3 5 This section would
prevent a bank, for example, from using a customer's SSN as a username,
password or personal identification number.23 6 Businesses that maintain
"computerized data that includes personal information ... shall notify the
owner or licensee of the personal information of a breach of the security of
a system if it is likely that the breach has resulted or will result in the
misuse of personal information of an individual residing in the State."2 37
This notice must be provided as soon as practicable after the breach has
been discovered.2 38 Finally, the Maryland Code requires state agencies to
228 See id. § 10-402(b).
229 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 93-901(c) (LexisNexis 2010).
230 See id. §93-901(a)(2).
231 Id. § 93-901(e)-(f)(1).
232 See id. § 93-902.
233 Id. § 93-902(a)(3) (limiting private places to a list of more than ten locations).
234 See id. § 93-902(b)(2).
235 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3402 (LexisNexis 2010).
236 Id. § 14-3402(a).
237 Id. § 14-3504(c)(1).
238 See id. § 14-3504(c)(2).
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adopt and post a privacy policy.2 39 The State Government Code states that
a state official: 2 40
[W]ho requests personal information for personal records
shall provide the following information to each person in
interest from whom personal information is collected:
(i) [T]he purpose for which the personal information
is collected;
(ii) [A]ny specific consequences to the person for
refusal to provide the personal information; the
person's right to inspect, amend, or correct
personal records, if any;
(iii) [W]hether the personal information is generally
available for public inspection; and ...
(v) [Wlhether the personal information is made
available or transferred to or shared with any entity
other than the official custodian.24 1
The code also states that "[e]ach unit of State government shall post its
privacy policies with regard to the collection of personal information,
including the policies specified in this subsection, on its Internet
website." 2 42
U. Massachusetts
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Massachusetts law requires the consent of all parties to a wire or oral
communication before such communication may be recorded. 243  This
provision was passed in order to allow law enforcement to better combat
organized crime. 2 " Interestingly, a Massachusetts appellate court has also
held "that the recorded conversation or communication does not need to be
239 See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-624 (LexisNexis 2010).
240 The Maryland Code uses the term official custodian in place of state official.
See id § 10-611(d) (stating that .'[o]fficial custodian' means an officer or
employee of the State or of a political subdivision who, whether or not the officer
or employee has physical custody and control of a public record, is responsible for
keeping the public record.").
241 Id. § 10-624(c)(3).
242 Id. § 10-624(c)(4).
243 See MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), (C) (2010) (defining an interception,
stating that all parties must consent to a legal interception, and stating that "[p]roof
of the installation of any intercepting device by any person under circumstances
evincing an intent to commit an interception, which is not authorized or permitted
by this section, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subparagraph.").244 Id. § 99(A).
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intelligible in order for the interception to violate the wiretapping
statute."24 5 Massachusetts does not have any other prominent statutes
pertaining to electronic monitoring. This is strange considering that it is
one of the few states that has codified an all-parties consent requirement.
V. Michigan
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Michigan, all parties must consent to any eavesdropping of a private
conversation. The statute reads as follows:
Any person who is present or who is not present during a
private conversation and who wilfully [sic] uses any device
to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of
all parties thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs or
procures another person to do the same in violation of this
section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in
a state prison for not more than 2 years or by a fine of not
more than $2,000.00, or both.246
To eavesdrop under Michigan law means "to overhear, record, amplify
or transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the
permission of all persons engaged in the discourse." 247 The statute applies
to eavesdropping whether or not the intercepting individual is a party to the
248
conversation.24 However, Michigan's eavesdropping statute "has been
interpreted by one court as applying only to situations in which a third party
has intercepted a communication. This interpretation allows a participant in
a conversation to record that conversation without the permission of other
parties.,249 That court held that:
An individual may not expect those he converses with to
record their discourses. Still, absent a request that
discussions be held "off the record", it is only reasonable to
expect that a conversation may be repeated, perhaps from
memory or from the handwritten notes of a party to the
conversation. A recording made by a participant is nothing
more than a more accurate record of what was said.
245 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Mass.; see also Com. v. Wright, 814 N.E.2d
741, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that "[i]n effect, the judge indicated, and
we agree, that the conversation or communication need not be intelligible, it is
enough if isolated words are intelligible.").
246 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539(c) (2010).24 7 Id. § 750.539(a)(2).
248 See id. § 750.539(c).
249 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Mich.; see Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Whether an individual should reasonably expect that an
ostensibly private conversation will be related by a
participant to third parties depends on that individual's
relation to the other participant. The individual may gauge
his expectations according to his own evaluation of the
person to whom he speaks: He has the ability to limit what
he says based upon that expectation. When a third party is
unilaterally given permission to listen in upon a
conversation, unknown to other participants, those other
participants are no longer able to evaluate and form
accurate expectations since they are without knowledge of
the third party. Therefore, it is not inconsistent to permit a
person to record and utilize conversations he participates in
yet deny him the right to unilaterally grant that ability to
third parties.2 50
In addition, the conversation must be private; 251 the problem is that the
statute does not adequately define what constitutes a private conversation.
Therefore, Michigan courts have been forced to address the meaning of the
phrase. The Michigan Supreme Court has said that "[d]espite the
Legislature failing to define 'private conversation' in the eavesdropping
statutes, its intent can be determined from the eavesdropping statutes
themselves. This is because the Legislature did define the term 'private
place."' 25 2 A "private place" under Michigan law "means a place where one
may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or
surveillance but does not include a place to which the public or substantial
group of the public has access." 2 53 With this definition in mind, the
Michigan Supreme Court stated that a "'private conversation' means a
conversation that a person reasonably expects to be free from casual or
hostile intrusion or surveillance." 25 4 The court further held that "although
technology provides a means for eavesdropping, the Michigan
eavesdropping statutes specifically protect citizens against such intrusions.
Therefore, a person is not unreasonable to expect privacy in a conversation
although he knows that technology makes it possible for others to
eavesdrop on such conversations."2 55 This type of wisdom would be very
helpful to guide Congress as it revamps the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act and its applicability to contemporary monitoring technology.
250 Sullivan, 324 N.W.2d at 60-61.
251 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539(c) (2010).
252 People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Mich. 2001).
253 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539(a)(1).
254 Stone, 621 N.W.2d at 704-05.
255 Id. at 706.
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2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Michigan law prohibits spying on individuals in private places. This
means that it is illegal to "[i]nstall, place, or use in any private place,
without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that
place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or
eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place." 25 State law allows
for the use of RFID technology in state identification cards as long as such
technology "is limited to a randomly assigned number which shall be
encrypted if agreed to by the department of homeland security, and does not
include biometric data." 257 Anyone collecting SSNs "in the ordinary course
of business" must create a privacy policy that discusses the use and
protection of this information.2 58 Employers in Michigan may:
[N]ot gather or keep a record of an employee's
associations, political activities, publications, or
communications of nonemployment activities .... This
prohibition on records shall not apply to the activities that
occur on the employer's premises or during the employee's
working hours with that employer that interfere with the
performance of the employee's duties or duties of other
employees.259
W. Minnesota
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Minnesota law allows one party to a wire, electronic or oral
communication to consent to its interception.260 More specifically, the
statute states that it is "not unlawful . .. to intercept a wire, electronic, or
oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
256 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539(d)(1)(a).
257 Id. § 28.304(3). Stating that the:
[S]ecretary of state shall ensure that the radio frequency
identification technology is secure from unauthorized data access
and includes reasonable security measures to protect against
unauthorized disclosure of personal information. An applicant
shall be required to sign a declaration acknowledging his or her
understanding of the radio frequency identification technology
before he or she is issued an enhanced driver license or enhanced
official state personal identification card.
Id.
258 See id § 445.84(1).
259 Id. § 423.508(1).
260 See MINN. STAT. § 626A.02(2)(d) (2010).
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such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or
laws of the United States or of any state."261
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Under Minnesota law, an individual commits a gross misdemeanor
when the person:
[S]urreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps . .. or installs or
uses any device for observing, photographing, recording,
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events.. .. in the
window or other aperture of a ... place where a reasonable
person would have an expectation of privacy and has
exposed or is likely to expose their intimate parts . . . or
the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate
parts; and does so with intent to intrude upon or interfere
with the privacy of the occupant.262
This prohibition would clearly apply to a locker room and might apply
if employers place recording technology in private places such as restrooms
and employee offices. However, an employer can argue that the
surveillance technology is allowed in vestibules of restrooms and in offices
as intimate parts are not likely to be exposed in such areas.
Minnesota law contains an entire section on government data practices.
State agencies that collect and use PII must "disclose any breach of the
security of the data following discovery or notification of the breach.
Notification must be made to any individual who is the subject of the data
and whose private or confidential data was, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person."263 All governmental
entities in Minnesota are required to create a privacy policy that describes
what types of PII will be collected, how it will be used and secured and how
individuals may access such information and consent to its
dissemination. 2 64 Government entities that place cookies on a user's
computer must also provide notice to such user as to how PII will be
collected, used and disseminated.2 65
261 id.
262 Id § 609.746(l)(c)-(d).
263 Id § 13.055(2) (stating that the "disclosure must be made in the most expedient
time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with (1) the legitimate
needs of a law enforcement agency ... or (2) any measures necessary to determine
the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable security of the data").
264 See id. § 13.15(3).
265 See id. (since amended to provide an exception for a cookie temporarily
installed by a government entity).
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On the employment front, the "employer may not ... administer a
genetic test or request, require, or collect protected genetic information
regarding a person as a condition of employment [or] affect the terms or
conditions of employment or terminate the employment of any person
based on protected genetic information." 26 6 In addition, "[n]o person shall
provide or interpret for any employer or employment agency protected
genetic information on a current or prospective employee. , The
Nonwork Activities section of the Minnesota Code states that an employer
"may not refuse to hire a job applicant or discipline or discharge an
employee because the applicant or employee engages in or has engaged in
the use or enjoyment of lawful consumable products, if the use or
enjoyment takes place off the premises of the employer during nonworking
hours."2 68 The phrase "lawful consumable products" means "products
whose use or enjoyment is lawful and which are consumed during use or
enjoyment, and includes food, alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverages, and
tobacco." 269  While most states prohibit discrimination based on tobacco
use only, Minnesota law expands its prohibition to all lawful products.
X. Mississippi
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
One person to a wire, oral or other communication may consent to its
interception in Mississippi.270 However, the interception may not be "for
the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of this state, or for the purpose
of committing any other injurious act."2 7 1 An interception under
Mississippi law "means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of a
wire, oral or other communication through the use of an electronic,
mechanical or other device."272 Individuals who are the victims of these
crimes may bring a civil action against the intercepting party.273 Somewhat
awkwardly, Mississippi's wiretapping statute states that:
This article shall not apply to a person who is a subscriber
to a telephone operated by a communication common
26 6 Id. § 181.974(2).
267 d
2 68 Id. § 181.938(2).
269 d
270 See MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-531(e) (2010) (stating that there is no civil
liability for "[a] person not acting under color of law who intercepts a wire, oral or
other communication if the person is a party to the communication, or if one (1) of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception").
271 Id. § 41-29-531(e)(1).
272 Id. § 41-29-501(g).
273 See id. § 41-29-529.
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carrier and who intercepts a communication on a telephone
to which he subscribes [and this] article shall not apply to
persons who are members of the household of the
subscriber who intercept communications on a telephone in
the home of the subscriber.27 4
It appears that this language is limited to a home telephone line but
might also include the telephone lines belonging to an employer.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Mississippi law states that:
It shall be unlawful for any public or private employer to
require as a condition of employment that any employee or
applicant for employment abstain from smoking or using
tobacco products during nonworking hours, provided that
the individual complies with applicable laws or policies
regulating smoking on the premises of the employer during
working hours.275
Y. Missouri
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Missouri:
An individual who is a party to a wire communication, or
who has the consent of one of the parties to the
communication, can lawfully record it or disclose its
contents, unless the person is intercepting the
communication for the purpose of committing a criminal or
tortious act .... Recording or disclosing the contents of a
wire communication by all other persons is a felony.276
Missouri law limits the prohibition to wire communications as opposed
to electronic and oral communications.27 7 An invasion of privacy in the
second degree occurs when an individual "knowingly views, photographs
or films another person, without that person's knowledge and consent,
while the person being viewed, photographed or filmed is in a state of full
or partial nudity and is in a place where one would have a reasonable
274 Id. § 41-29-535.
275 Id. § 71-7-33.
276 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Mo. (construing Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.402
(2010)).
277 See id.
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expectation of privacy." 2 78 This eavesdropping provision would likely only
apply in the workplace to restrooms, locker rooms and perhaps walled-off
employee offices. .
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Missouri makes it a Class A misdemeanor to "require an employee to
have personal identification microchip technology implanted into an
employee for any reason." 27 9  This technology is specified as "a
subcutaneous or surgically implanted microchip technology device or
product that contains or is designed to contain a unique identification
number and personal information that can be noninvasively retrieved or
transmitted with an external scanning device." 280  Missouri also bans
employers from discriminating against employees based on their off-duty
consumption of alcohol or tobacco.2 8 ' This is one of the few state statutes
that prohibits discrimination based only on alcohol or tobacco. Most
lifestyle discrimination statutes ban discrimination based only on tobacco
use or more broadly ban discrimination based on all legal off-duty
activities. More specifically, the law states that it is an:
[I]mproper employment practice for an employer to refuse
to hire, or to discharge, any individual, or to otherwise
disadvantage any individual, with respect to compensation,
terms or conditions of employment because the individual
uses lawful alcohol or tobacco products off the premises of
the employer during hours such individual is not working
for the employer, unless such use interferes with the duties
and performance of the employee, the employee's
coworkers, or the overall operation of the employer's
business.282
However, employers may provide health insurance benefits at lower
rates/deductibles "for employees who do not smoke or use tobacco
products."283 Interestingly, it is not true of employees who consume
alcohol but do not smoke or use tobacco products.
278 Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.253(1) (2010).
279 Id. § 285.035(l).
280 Id. § 285.035(2).
281 Id. § 290.145.
282 id
283 See id.
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Z. Montana
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
Article II § 10 of the Montana Constitution promulgates a right to
privacy. The provision states that "[t]he right of individual privacy is
essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest."2 84 By its specific
terms, this provision is limited to a state action which invades an
individual's privacy. The Montana Supreme Court held as much in a case
styled State v. Long.2 85 In Long, a private citizen/landlord noticed a light on
in his tenant's property; the landlord entered the attic of the property to find
marijuana and contacted the authorities who seized the drugs.28 6 The court
held that this was a private search and that:
The public policy issue of whether the privacy clause [in
the Montana Constitution] should cover private action has
not been treated in the majority opinion. Rather, we have
sought to determine whether there was a clear intention
expressed by the framers to depart from traditional
constitutional concepts. We found there was not. Therefore,
we have limited the application of the privacy clause to
state action.287
The court also stated that the "battle cry sounded in the dissent [to
apply this constitutional protection against invasions by private actors] may,
at first blush, have an alluring ring to liberals and civil libertarians. There is,
however, a real danger in extending privacy rights to the interaction of
individuals." 288
2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Montana, all parties to a wire communication must consent to its
interception. The Privacy in Communications section of the Montana Code
makes it unlawful for a person to state that "a person commits the offense
of violating privacy in communications if the person knowingly or
purposely ... records or causes to be recorded a conversation by use of a
hidden electronic or mechanical device that reproduces a human
conversation without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation., 28 9
" MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
285 State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1985).286 Id. at 154.
287 Id. at 167 (Morrison, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
288 d
289 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(c) (2010).
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Violation of this provision may result in fines and/or imprisonment for up
to six months.290
3. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Employers in Montana may not discriminate against their employees
based on such employees' use of lawful products. The relevant section
states that "an employer may not refuse to employ or license and may not
discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, promotion,
or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the individual
legally uses a lawful product off the employer's premises during
nonworking hours."291 The term "lawful products" includes any "product
that is legally consumed, used, or enjoyed and includes food, beverages,
and tobacco." 2 92 This lifestyle discrimination statute is more broad than
similar statutes in other states which prohibit discrimination based only on
tobacco use.
Finally, many Montana governmental agencies are required to post
privacy policies. The Montana Governmental Internet Information Privacy
Act requires state agencies that collect PII online to ensure that the website:
(1) [I]dentifies its operator, (2) provides the address and
telephone number at which the operator may be contacted
as well as an electronic means for contacting the operator;
and generally describes the operator's information
practices, including policies to protect the privacy of the
user and the steps taken to protect the security of the
collected information.2 93
In addition:
[I]f the personally identifiable information may be used for
a purpose other than the express purpose of the website or
may be given or sold to a third party, except as required by
law, then the operator shall ensure that the website
includes: a clear and conspicuous notice to the user that the
information collected could be used for other than the
purposes of the website; a general description of the types
of third parties that may obtain the information; and a clear,
conspicuous, and easily understood online procedure
290 Id. § 45-8-213(3)(a).
291 Id. § 39-2-313(2).
2 92 Id § 39-2-313(1).
293 Id § 2-17-552(2)-(3).
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requiring an affirmative expression of the user's permission
before the information is collected.29 4
Montana law also protects the integrity of PII when the information is
subject to a security breach. The state code requires:
Any person or business that conducts business in Montana
and that owns or licenses [or maintains] computerized data
that includes personal information [to] disclose any breach
of the security of the data system following discovery or
notification of the breach to any resident of Montana whose
unencrypted personal information was or is reasonably
believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized
295person.
The disclosure must be made without unreasonable delay, consistent
with the legitimate needs of law enforcement ... or consistent with any
measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the
reasonable integrity of the data system."29 6
AA. Nebraska
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Nebraska law only requires the consent of one party to an electronic,
297
wire or oral communication to consent to its interception. The party to
the communication may intercept or authorize a third party to intercept on
her behalf.298 This authorization to intercept is valid unless the interception
is "intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state."299
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Nebraska is one of the few states that requires businesses to adhere to
their online PII privacy practices. This PII privacy law is codified in the
Deceptive Trade Practices section of the state code. The relevant section
states that an individual commits a deceptive trade practice when such
person-in the course of a business, vocation or occupation-"[k]nowingly
makes a false or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the
internet or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of personal
294 Id. § 2-17-552(3).
295 Id. § 30-14-1704(l)-(2).
29 6 Id. § 30-14-1704.
297 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-290(2)(c) (2010).
298 See id.
299 d
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information submitted by members of the public."3 0 The irony with such a
prohibition is that individuals and businesses are protected from violating
this statute as long as they refrain from posting any privacy policy at all.
The only liability comes when they post such a policy and then
subsequently violate its terms. A better law would follow California's
privacy policy statute and require individuals and businesses that collect PII
to actually post a privacy policy. Then, all collectors of PII would be
potentially liable for false and misleading statements in their privacy
policies. However, Nebraska's law is better than no protection for PII at
all-which is the case today in the majority of states.
The Nebraska Financial Data Protection and Consumer Notification of
Data Security Breach Act of 2006 protects providers of PII when such
information has potentially been compromised. Individuals and businesses
that conduct business in Nebraska and own or license PII (or individuals or
businesses that maintain PII) referring to Nebraska residents must (1)
conduct an investigation when such information might be compromised due
to a security breach and (2) provide notice to the affected Nebraska
residents if such investigation determines that the PII might be used for
unauthorized purposes.o' Importantly, "[a]ny waiver of the provisions of
the Financial Data Protection and Consumer Notification of Data Security
Breach Act of 2006 is contrary to public policy and is void and
unenforceable."30 2
AB. Nevada
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Nevada's laws surrounding interceptions of electronic communications
are both interesting and rather unique. One relevant statute reads: "[e]very
person who shall intercept, read or in any manner interrupt or delay the
sending of a message over any telephone line shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor."3 03 Another provision states that:
[I]t is unlawful for any person to intercept or attempt to
intercept any wire communication unless: (a) The
interception or attempted interception is made with the
prior consent of one of the parties to the communication;
and (b) An emergency situation exists and it is impractical
to obtain a court order ... before the interception.
00 Id. § 87-302(a)(14).
301 See id. § 87-803.
302 Id. § 87-805.
303 NEV. REv. STAT. § 707.900 (2010).
3 Id. § 200.620 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, it appears that most instances of wiretapping in Nevada are
prohibited. It would be rare for an employer to have an "emergency
situation" as required by Nevada law which allows management to monitor
employee conversations. It also appears that this consent provision only
applies to law enforcement seeking a warrant but not having the time to
properly obtain one. Therefore, Nevada courts have held that interception
of a wire communication, such as a telephone call, by fewer than all
participants involved is prohibited.30 5 One Nevada court stated that: "[i]f
the legislature had wanted to create that limitation . .. it would have done
so. It seems apparent that the legislature believed that intrusion upon
Nevadans' privacy by nonconsensual recording of telephone conversations
was a greater intrusion than the recording of conversations in person."o 6
Nevada law also holds that:
[A] person shall not intrude upon the privacy of other
persons by surreptitiously listening to, monitoring or
recording, or attempting to listen to, monitor or record, by
means of any mechanical, electronic or other listening
device, any private conversation engaged in by the other
persons, or disclose the existence, content, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of any conversation so listened
to, monitored or recorded, unless authorized to do so by
one of the persons engaging in the conversation.307
This discussion makes clear that one party may consent to the
eavesdropping upon a private oral conversation but that both parties must
consent to the interception of a wire communication. Also important is that
this statute does not require the conversation to be held in a "private place"
as do many other similar state laws.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Nevada law prohibits employers from discriminating against their
employees based on the use of lawful products outside of work hours. The
statute clarifies that:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire a prospective employee; or (b)
Discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee
concerning his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because he engages in the lawful
use in this state of any product outside the premises of the
employer during his nonworking hours, if that use does not
305 See, e.g., Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940-41 (Nev. 1998).
106 Id. at 940.
3 07NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.650 (2010).
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adversely affect his ability to perform his job or the safety
of other employees. 308
The law also states that it is "unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation doing business or employing labor in the State of Nevada to
make any rule or regulation prohibiting or preventing any employee from
engaging in politics or becoming a candidate for any public office in this
state. 3 o9
Nevada also statutorily restricts the fraudulent use of RFI) technology.
The Nevada Revised Statute states that:
A person shall not knowingly, intentionally and for the
purpose of committing fraud, identity theft or any other
unlawful act: (a) Capture, store or read information from
the radio frequency identification document of another
person without the other person's knowledge and prior
consent; or (b) Retain, use or disclose information that the
person knows to have been obtained from the radio
frequency identification document of another person
without the other person's knowledge and prior consent.31 o
AC. New Hampshire
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
New Hampshire law contains a stricter version of the standard
interception statute. In the state, an individual is guilty of a Class B felony
if such person, without the consent of all parties to the communication,
"[w]ilfully [sic] intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any telecommunication or oral
communication."3" The statute is also violated if an individual:
Wilfully [sic] uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other
person to use or endeavor to use any electronic,
mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral
communication when .. . such use or endeavor to use (A)
takes place on premises of any business or other
commercial establishment, or (B) obtains or is for the
purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations
of any business or other commercial establishment.3 12
30 8 Id § 613.333.
309 Id § 613.040.
"
0 d § 205.46515.
311 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(l)(a) (2010).
312 Id. § 570-A:2(I)(b)(3).
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Therefore, employers would specifically need the consent of all
employees who are monitored when such monitoring occurs on the
worksite or involves information relating to the business. Class B felonies
in New Hampshire are punishable by one to seven years in prison in
addition to any fines which may be imposed." This is one of the most
serious incarceration penalties imposed by a state when it comes to illegal
interceptions of electronic communications. Interestingly, New Hampshire
law makes it only a misdemeanor if only one party to a telecommunication
or oral communication consents and the communication is intercepted by a
party to the communication or a third party not present.3 14
The law also prohibits eavesdropping, defined as when a person:
[U]nlawfully and without the consent of the persons
entitled to privacy therein, installs or uses . .. [i]n any
private place, any device for the purpose of observing,
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting, or in
any way transmitting images or sounds in such place; or
[o]utside a private place, any device for the purpose of
hearing, recording, amplifying, broadcasting, or in any way
transmitting images or sounds originating in such place
which would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible
outside such place.
A private place "means a place where one may reasonably expect to be
safe from surveillance including public restrooms, locker rooms, the
interior of one's dwelling place, or any place where a person's private body
parts including genitalia, buttocks, or female breasts may be exposed."316
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
New Hampshire law states that "[n]o employer shall require as a
condition of employment that any employee or applicant for employment
abstain from using tobacco products outside the course of employment, as
long as the employee complies with any workplace policy."3 " This is the
standard off-duty protection clause, targeted only towards tobacco use, that
is found in many other state codes. There is an exception that requires the
employee to comply with workplace policy. However, such policies would
not legally be allowed to disallow tobacco use specifically. An interesting
313 See id § 570-A:2(I)(a); id. § 651:2(II)(b) ("Class B felonies are crimes so
designated by statute within or outside this code and any crime defined outside of
this code for which the maximum penalty, exclusive of fine, is imprisonment in
excess of one year but not in excess of 7 years.").
314 Id. § 570-A:2(I)(a).
3 Id. § 644:9(I)(b)-(c).
316 Id. § 644:9(11).
317Id. § 275:37(a).
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dilemma would occur if such policies attempted to mitigate such use
through policies that rewarded "healthy behavior" or something along such
lines.
New Hampshire has also enacted a security breach statute that requires,
among other things, that any:
[P]erson doing business in this state who owns or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information shall,
when it becomes aware of a security breach, promptly
determine the likelihood that the information has been or
will be misused. If the determination is that misuse of the
information has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur,
or if a determination cannot be made, the person shall
notify the affected individuals as soon as possible as
required under this subdivision.3 1 8
Along these lines, the state has created an RFID Commission to study
the use of radio frequency technology in both the public and private
sectors.3 19 One New Hampshire state statute (with limited exceptions)
prohibits the governmental use of RFID technology on state highways to
identify the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of its occupants.320
AD. New Jersey
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
New Jersey's interception statute bans all purposeful intercepting, or
- 321
any endeavor to intercept, any wire, electronic or oral communication.
There is an exception, however, as long as one party consents before an
electronic communication is intercepted, either by a party to such
communication or by a third party.322 More specifically, it is not illegal for:
A person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire,
electronic or oral communication, where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception
unless such communication is intercepted or used for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or
of this State or for the purpose of committing any other
Id. § 359-C:20.
3
'
9 See, e.g., HAROLD CLAMPITT, THE RFID CERTIFICATION TEXTBOOK 419
(American RFID Solutions, Eric C. Jones ed., 3d ed. 2007).
320 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2010).
321 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2010).
322 Id. § 2A:156A-4.
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injurious act. The fact that such person is the subscriber to
a particular telephone does not constitute consent effective
to authorize interception of communications among parties
not including such person on that telephone. 323
This means that employers who do not have the consent of any party to
a communication may not legally intercept such communication merely
because they provide the telephone line or Ethernet connection. This
important privacy protective provision is missing from many other state
interception statutes.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
The Labor and Workers Compensation section of the state code
declares that no employer:
[S]hall refuse to hire or employ any person or shall
discharge from employment or take any adverse action
against any employee with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions or other privileges of employment because that
person does or does not smoke or use other tobacco
products, unless the employer has a rational basis for doing
so which is reasonably related to the employment,
including the responsibilities of the employee or
prospective employee.3 24
This provision is a bit different from the anti-smoking discrimination
provisions from other states in that New Jersey employers are allowed to
discriminate if they can articulate a "rational basis" that is related to the
employment relationship. This allows employers more flexibility than they
enjoy in other state smoking discrimination bans. The New Jersey lifestyle
discrimination statute also declares that "[n]othing contained in this act
shall be construed to affect any applicable laws, rules or workplace policies
concerning smoking or the use of other tobacco products during the course
of employment."3 25
AE. New Mexico
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
New Mexico law requires the consent of only one party before a
communication may be lawfully intercepted. The Abuse of Privacy chapter
in the state code declares that
323 id
324 Id § 34:6B-1.
325 Id § 34:6B-2.
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[I]nterference with communications consists of knowingly
and without lawful authority ... cutting, breaking, tapping
or making any connection with any telegraph or telephone
line, wire, cable or instrument belonging to or in the lawful
possession or control of another, without the consent of
such person owning, possessing or controlling such
property [or] reading, interrupting, taking or copying any
message, communication or report intended for another by
telegraph or telephone without the consent of a sender or
intended recipient thereof.3 26
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
New Mexico's Employee Privacy chapter states that it is unlawful for
an employer to:
Refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
disadvantage any individual, with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because the
individual is a smoker or nonsmoker, provided that the
individual complies with applicable laws or policies
regulating smoking on the premises of the employer during
working hours; or
Require as a condition of employment that any employee
or applicant for employment abstain from smoking or using
tobacco products during nonworking hours, provided the
individual complies with applicable laws or policies
regulating smoking on the premises of the employer during
working hours.327
The provisions of this section:
[S]hall not be deemed to protect any activity that:
materially threatens an employer's legitimate conflict of
interest policy reasonably designed to protect the
employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or other
proprietary interests; or relates to a bona fide occupational
requirement and is reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular
employee or a particular group of employees, rather than to
all employees of the employer.328
32 6 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (2010).
3271 d. § 50-11-3.
328 d
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AF. New York
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
It is a Class E felony in New York to intercept an electronic
communication without the consent of at least one party to such
communication.32 9 More specifically, the statute bans eavesdropping and
defines that concept as follows: "A person is guilty of eavesdropping when
he unlawfully engages in wiretapping, mechanical overhearing of a
conversation, or intercepting or accessing of an electronic
communication."330 The one-party consent exception, however, comes with
the definition of wiretapping. The statute states that '[w]iretapping' means
"the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic
communication by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without
the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument,
device or equipment." 3 3 1 The code also criminalizes situations where, for
no legitimate purpose, a person:
[I]ntentionally uses or installs, or permits the utilization or
installation of an imaging device to surreptitiously view,
broadcast or record a person in a bedroom, changing room,
fitting room, restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom, shower
or any room assigned to guests or patrons in a motel, hotel
or inn, without such person's knowledge or consent.332
Employers will always try and argue that their surveillance of a
bathroom, changing (locker) room, etc. was made for a legitimate purpose
such as during a theft investigation.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
New York law is particularly protective of employee rights outside of
the workplace. For example, the New York Labor Code declares that:
[U]nless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for
any employer or employment agency to refuse to hire,
employ or license, or to discharge from employment or
otherwise discriminate against an individual in
compensation, promotion or terms, conditions or privileges
of employment because of... an individual's political
activities outside of working hours, off of the employer's
329 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2010).33o Id. § 250.50.
331 Id. § 250.00.
332 Id. § 250.45.
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premises and without use of the employer's equipment or
other property, if such activities are legal.
This statute places New York in a small minority of states that protect
an employee from discrimination based on such employee's political
activities. Additionally, employers cannot discriminate against:
[A]n individual's legal use of consumable products prior to
the beginning or after the conclusion of the employee's
work hours, and off of the employer's premises and
without use of the employer's equipment or other property
[or] an individual's legal recreational activities outside
work hours, off of the employer's premises and without use
of the employer's equipment or other property.334
This is one of the broadest state law protections for employee off-duty
consumption and activities.
On the information privacy front, New York state law requires that
state agencies create privacy policies. 33s More specifically, each:
[S]tate agency that maintains a state agency website shall
adopt an internet privacy policy which shall, at a minimum,
include the information required by the [state of New
York] model internet privacy policy. Each state agency
shall post its internet privacy policy on its website. Such
posting shall include a conspicuous and direct link to such
privacy policy.336
The state code also contains a model internet privacy policy.3 37 In
addition, the New York code states that:
No state agency shall collect personal information
concerning a user through a state agency website, or
disclose personal information concerning a user to any
person .. . or other entity, including internal staff who do
not need the information in the performance of their
official duties .. . unless such user has consented to the
collection or disclosure of such personal information. For
the purposes of this section, the voluntary disclosure of
personal information to a state agency by a user through a
state agency website, whether solicited or unsolicited, shall
constitute consent to the collection or disclosure of the
3 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2010).
334 Id. § 201 -d(2)(b)-(c).
3 See N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 203-204 (McKinney 2010).
336 Id. § 203.
337 id
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information by the state agency for the purposes for which
the user disclosed it to the state agency, as reasonably
ascertainable from the nature and terms of the disclosure.338
State agencies that own, license or maintain PII must disclose any
breaches to their security systems to any New York resident whose P11 is
reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person.339
Businesses that own, license, or maintain PII must disclose security
breaches where the PII is reasonably believed to have fallen into the hands
of an unauthorized individual.3 40 Finally, businesses must take care to
properly dispose of any records containing P1. 3 4 1
AG. North Carolina
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
North Carolina law requires that at least one party to an electronic,342
wire, or oral communication consent to its interception. More
specifically, the state code states that "a person is guilty of a Class H felony
if, without the consent of at least one party to the communication, the
person [w]illfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or .electronic
communication."43 "In interpreting the meaning of 'consent,' a [North
Carolina] appellate court determined that implied consent to interception
occurs when one party is warned of monitoring and yet continues with the
conversation."" In the case of State v. Price, the court found that "both
parties to the conversation heard the recorded warning that the call was
subject to monitoring and recording and that they consented, at least
impliedly, by continuing with the conversation in the face of that
warning." 34 5
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
North Carolina law protects most employees in at least some their off-
duty activities.34 6 The relevant statute applies to both state entities and
3 See id. § 204.
" See id. § 208.340 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney 2010).
341 See id. § 399-h.
342 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287 (2010).
343 Id. § 15A-287(a)(1).
34 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at N.C; see also State v. Price, 611 S.E.2d 891,
897 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
345 See Price, 611 S.E.2d at 897.
346 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2010).
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private entities with at least three regular employees.347 The provision
states that it is:
[A]n unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire a prospective employee, or discharge or
otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because the prospective employee or the
employee engages in or has engaged in the lawful use of
lawful products if the activity occurs off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours and does not adversely
affect the employee's job performance or the person's
ability to properly fulfill the responsibilities of the position
in question or the safety of other employees.
There are a few key exemptions to this prohibition, the most interesting
of which states that it is not an illegal practice to "[r]estrict the lawful use of
lawful products by employees during nonworking hours if the restriction
relates to the fundamental objectives of the organization." 34 9 Employers
may attempt to argue that having a healthy or health-conscious workforce is
a fundamental objective of the organization and thereby attempt to ban
smoking outside of business hours. The section does not prohibit an
employer from:
[O]ffering, imposing, or having in effect a health,
disability, or life insurance policy distinguishing between
employees for the type or price of coverage based on the
use or nonuse of lawful products if each of the following is
met:
1. Differential rates assessed employees reflect
actuarially justified differences in the provision of
employee benefits.
2. The employer provides written notice to employees
setting forth the differential rates imposed by
insurance carriers. [and]
3. The employer contributes an equal amount to the
insurance carrier on behalf of each employee of the
employer. 350
On the subject of quality of life issues, North Carolina also requires
employers to provide up to four hours per year for parents and guardians to
347 id
348 d
349 d3 50 Id. § 95-28.2(d).
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be involved in their child's school.35 Finally, no "person [or] private entity
shall deny or refuse employment to any person or discharge any person
from employment on account of the person's having requested genetic
testing or counseling services, or on the basis of genetic information
obtained concerning the person or a member of the person's family." 3 52
On the PII front, businesses must disclose security breaches of PII that
they own, license, maintain or possess.5 Such notice must be clear and
conspicuous [and include]:
1. A description of the incident in general terms.
2. A description of the type of personal information that
was subject to the unauthorized access and acquisition.
3. A description of the general acts of the business to
protect the personal information from further
unauthorized access.
4. A telephone number for the business that the person
may call for further information and assistance, if one
exists.
5. Advice that directs the person to remain vigilant by
reviewing account statements and monitoring free
credit reports.
6. The toll-free numbers and addresses for the major
consumer reporting agencies. [and]
7. The toll-free numbers, addresses, and Web site
addresses for the Federal Trade Commission and the
North Carolina Attorney General's Office, along with a
statement that the individual can obtain information
from these sources about preventing identity theft.354
On a separate note, North Carolina state -law prohibits state institutions
from doing much of anything with an individual's social security
number.3 55
AH. North Dakota
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping in North Dakota occurs when a person "intentionally
intercepts any wire or oral communication by use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device [or] intentionally discloses to any other person
351 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3 (2010).
352 Id. § 95-28.1A.
. See id. § 75-65.
354 Id. § 75-65(d).
.ss See id. § 132-1.10.
676 Vol. 5:2
2010 The Privacy Bailout: State Government 677
Involvement in the Privacy Arena
or intentionally uses the contents of any wire or oral communication,
knowing that the information was obtained through the interception of a
wire or oral communication."35 6 . An intercepting party has a defense to this
crime when such individual "was a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication had given prior consent to such
interception, and ... such communication was not intercepted for the
purpose of committing a crime or other unlawful harm." 357 Eavesdropping
is classified as a Class C felony under North Dakota law. In addition, "a
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he secretly loiters about any
building with intent to overhear discourse or conversation therein and to
repeat or publish the same with intent to vex, annoy, or injure others." 35 8 It
is unlikely that this provision would be implicated in the employment
context as employers monitor employees for reasons such as liability
protection, policy enforcement or investigatory purposes. It is harder for an
employee-plaintiff to show that an employer monitored in order to vex,
annoy or injure another party as required by the statute.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
As of 2007 in North Dakota, a person "may not require that an
individual have inserted into that individual's body a microchip containing
a radio frequency identification device. A violation of this section is a class
A misdemeanor."3 59 This type of prohibition has been slowly appearing in
state codes over the past five years likely because someone has actually
experienced such an implantation and complained.
The state code also prohibits discrimination based on an employee's
lawful off-duty activities as follows:
It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire a person; to discharge an employee; or to
accord adverse or unequal treatment to a person or
employee with respect to application, hiring,
training, apprenticeship, tenure, promotion, upgrading,
compensation, layoff, or a term, privilege, or condition of
employment, because of... participation in lawful activity
off the employer's premises during nonworking hours
which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-
360
related interests of the employer.
356 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02(1)(a}-(b) (2009).
3 57 Id. § 12.1-15-02(3)(c).
3 1Id. § 12.1-15-02(2).
359 Id. § 12.1-15-06.
360 Id. § 14-02.4-03.
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This prohibition is stricter than other states' lifestyle discrimination
statutes in the fact that: (1) the statute covers more than off-duty tobacco
use and (2) the practice at issue must be in "direct conflict" with the
employer's business-related interests. A similar statute in Colorado
requires less; an employer may discriminate against an employee's off-duty
conduct in Colorado as long as the discrimination "[rielates to a bona fide
occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular group of
employees ... or [i]s necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of
interest." 36 ' A reasonable and rational relationship to employment activities
as is required in Colorado is much more lenient than a direct conflict as is
required in North Dakota. Time will tell whether employers in Colorado
take advantage of the state's looser standard while employers in North
Dakota find that trying to prohibit employee's off-duty activities is a
tougher road to navigate.
Al. Ohio
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Ohio law creates a very loose standard when it comes to intercepting a
wire, electronic, or oral communication. The relevant statute declares that
"[n]o person purposely shall ... [i]ntercept, attempt to intercept, or procure
another person to intercept or attempt to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication."362 An exemption exists when a person:
[I]ntercepts a wire, oral, or electronic communication, if
the person is a party to the communication or if one of the
parties to the communication has given the person prior
consent to the interception, and if the communication is not
intercepted for the purpose of committing a criminal
offense or tortious act in violation of the laws or
Constitution of the United States or this state or for the
purpose of committing any other injurious act.363
The "other injurious act" clause of Ohio's prohibition is additional to
the standard phraseology from other one-party consent states. The addition
of the "other injurious act" phraseology adds more angles for a plaintiff to
succeed in a case against an employer for monitoring in the workplace than
the plaintiff has if the prohibition is limited to a "criminal offense or
tortious act in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States or
[of the state of Ohio]."
361 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(a)-(b) (2009).
362 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
363 Id. § 2933.52(B)(4).
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AJ. Oklahoma
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Oklahoma law requires that only one party to a wire, electronic, or oral
communication consent to an interception of such communication. More
specifically, it is a felony in Oklahoma when an individual "[w]illfully
intercepts, endeavors to intercept or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral or electronic communication."
This type of violation is punishable by a fine of not less than $5000 and
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.365  The Acts Not
Prohibited section in the same chapter, however, states that:
[A] person not acting under color of law [may legally]
intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication when
such person is a party to the communication or when one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless the communication is intercepted
for the purpose of committing any criminal act. 6
Some states also prohibit interception, even with one party's consent,
for the purpose of committing tortious acts. Oklahoma has limited this
exception to the exception to criminal acts only.
Oklahoma's eavesdropping statute states that "[e]very person guilty of
secretly loitering about any building, with intent to overhear discourse
therein, and to repeat or publish the same to vex, annoy, or injure others, is
guilty of a misdemeanor."36 7 It would be interesting to determine whether
this provision could be used against an employer who monitors employees
by loitering outside of their offices. The likelihood is that such actions
would be legal under this statute as management would likely to make a
strong case that the eavesdropping was not meant to vex, annoy, or injure
employees. This statute, by its express terms, seems limited to the
overhearing of communications without the assistance of monitoring
technology.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Oklahoma law states that "[n]o person, state, county, or local
governmental entity or corporate entity may require an individual to
undergo the implanting of a microchip or permanent mark of any kind or
3" OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 176.3(1) (2010).
365 See id.
36 Id. § 176.4(5).3 6 7Id. at tit. 21, § 1202.
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nature upon the individual." 3 6 8  For violations if this provision, the
Oklahoma Department of Health "may impose a fine not to exceed Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000) on any person who violates this act. Each day
of continued violation shall constitute a separate offense." 369 In addition,
Oklahoma has its own lifestyle discrimination statute. The relevant section
declares that employers may not:
Discharge any individual, or otherwise disadvantage any
individual, with respect to compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment because the individual is a
nonsmoker or smokes or uses tobacco products during
nonworking hours; or [r]equire as a condition of
employment that any employee or applicant for
employment abstain from smoking or using tobacco
products during nonworking hours."370
AK. Oregon
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
The state of Oregon allows one party to consent to the interception of a
wire or oral communication. In the words of the relevant statute:
[A]ny person who willfully intercepts, attempts to intercept
or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to
intercept any wire or oral communication where such
person is not a party to the communication and where none
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to the interception, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."3 71
In addition, except as authorized in the state wiretapping statute, a
person may not "[o]btain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a
conversation by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus,
whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, if not all participants
in the conversation are specifically informed that their conversation is being
obtained."372 This section of the Oregon Code would prohibit employers
who are not a party to a communication from obtaining a recording of their
employees without the consent of all parties to the communication.
368 Id. at tit. 63, § 1-1430(A).
369 Id. at tit. 63, § 1-1430(B).
370 Id. at tit. 40, § 500.
3" OR. REv. STAT. § 165.543(1) (2009).
372 Id. § 165.540(l)(c).
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2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
The Oregon Code is very protective when it comes to privacy
surrounding an employee's religious and political viewpoint. For example,
Oregon law states that:
An employer .. . may not discharge, discipline or otherwise
penalize or threaten to discharge, discipline or otherwise
penalize or take any adverse employment action against an
employee ... [b]ecause the employee declines to attend or
participate in an employer-sponsored meeting or
communication with the employer.. . if the primary
purpose of the meeting or communication is to
communicate the opinion of the employer about religious
or political matters."373
This statute is designed to hinder employer efforts to pressure
employees to toe the party line when it comes to the political or religious
stance of management. This provision becomes particularly interesting in
cases where politics and ideology may play a major role in an
organization's culture. For example, political leanings often play a role in
various institutions of higher education and such stances can create
discomfort for employees with differing belief systems. On the other hand,
violations of this statute might be rare as management's positions on
politics and religion are generally passed along subtly via the organizational
culture rather than discussed at employer-sponsored meetings.
Interestingly, Oregon law contains a related statute that reads:
If an employer requires an applicant or employee to have
an academic degree from a post-secondary institution to
qualify for a position, but does not require a degree with a
specific title, it is an unlawful employment practice for the
employer to refuse to hire or promote or in any manner
discriminate or retaliate against the applicant or employee
only because the applicant or employee meets the
educational requirements for the position by having a
degree with a title in theology or religious occupations
from a school that, when the degree was issued, was a
school described in [the Education chapter of the state
code] .
This provision helps to reduce discrimination against religion in the
hiring process.
1 Id. § 659.785.
374 Id. § 659A.318.
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Finally, Oregon's lifestyle discrimination statute declares that it is "an
unlawful employment practice for any employer to require, as a condition
of employment, that any employee or prospective employee refrain from
using lawful tobacco products during nonworking hours, except when the
restriction relates to a bona fide occupational requirement."37  This is
standard language for a lifestyle discrimination statute prohibiting
discrimination based on an employee's off-duty tobacco use.
AL. Pennsylvania
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Pennsylvania law is one of the rare states that requires all parties to
consent to the interception of an electronic, wire, or oral communication.37 6
More specifically, the relevant statute declares that: "It shall not be
unlawful and no prior court approval shall be required under this chapter
for. . . [a] person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication,
where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such
interception."3 77
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Pennsylvania laws states that it is a deceptive or fraudulent business
practice for a person-in the course of business-to "knowingly make a false
or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the Internet or
otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of personal
information submitted by members of the public." 37 8 As stated previously,
the major problem with such privacy policy requirements is that businesses
are not required to post a policy in the first place. In fact, if a business does
post a privacy policy, then it may be held liable for any breach of privacy
policy terms. If a business strategically chooses not post a privacy policy,
management has proposed no terms to breach and cannot be held liable for
the ways they collect, use and disseminate PII. Again, this type of statute is
better than no privacy policy statute at all-but it could be strengthened by
requiring all businesses that collect, use, store, or disseminate PII to at least
post a policy. Then, consumers will understand how their PII is treated and
may choose not to submit. In addition, companies will be liable for
breaching privacy policy terms.
Pennsylvania also has a security breach notification law that states:
...Id. § 659A.315.376 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2010).
377 Id. § 5704(4).
78 Id. § 4107(10).
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An entity that maintains, stores or manages computerized
data that includes personal information shall provide notice
of any breach of the security of the system following
discovery of the breach of the security of the system to any
resident of this Commonwealth whose unencrypted and
unredacted personal information was or is reasonably
believed to have been accessed and acquired by an
unauthorized person. Except as provided ... or in order to
take any measures necessary to determine the scope of the
breach and to restore the reasonable integrity of the data
system, the notice shall be made without unreasonable
delay. For the purpose of this section, a resident of this
Commonwealth may be determined to be an individual
whose principal mailing address, as reflected in the
computerized data which is maintained, stored or managed
by the entity, is in this Commonwealth.37 9
AM. Rhode Island
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Rhode Island law provides that "any person who willfully intercepts,
attempts to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to
intercept, any wire, electronic, or oral communication . .. shall be
imprisoned for not more than five (5) years."38 0 One exception to this
prohibition states that it is not unlawful for:
A person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire,
electronic, or oral communication, where the person is a
party to the communication, or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to the interception
unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in the violation of
the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state
or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act., 381
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island "has also stated that Rhode
Island's wiretapping laws should be interpreted more strictly than federal
wiretapping statutes 'in the interest of giving the full measure of protection
to an individual's privacy."'
382
379 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2303 (West 2010).
380 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21(a) (2009).
381 Id. § 11-35-21(c)(3).
382 CAN WE TAPE? supra note 41, at R.I. (quoting State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89,
100 (R.I. 2001)).
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. 2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
The Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005 states that a
"business that owns or licenses computerized unencripted [sic] personal
information about a Rhode Island resident shall implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the
information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure."383 In addition:
A business that discloses computerized unencripted [sic]
personal information about a Rhode Island resident
pursuant to a contract with a nonaffiliated third-party shall
require by contract that the third-party implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the
personal information from unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure."38 4
These PII protection provisions are likely to go a long way in protecting
such information from making its way to the open market. It is doubtful
that a purchaser of PII who desires to sell such information would be
interested in signing a contract promising to secure the same data it wishes
to disseminate. In addition, the state also has the standard security breach
notification statute that applies to both state agencies and individuals.'
AN. South Carolina
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
Article I, Section 10 of the South Carolina constitution creates a right to
privacy. The relevant section states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, the person
or thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained.
This provision has been held to only apply to invasions of privacy by
state actors as opposed to private parties. For example, in Southern Bell
383 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-2(2) (2009).
" Id. § 11-49.2-112(3).311Id. § 11-49.2-3.
386 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
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Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Hamm, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held:
Before deciding whether the [Caller ID service behind the
alleged invasion of privacy in the case] is violative of
constitutional rights of privacy, however, we must first
determine that the actions of the South Carolina PSC rose
to the level of 'state action' as, absent that involvement, the
constitutional right to privacy does not attach." 387
In addition, "[t]hough article I, section 10 of the South Carolina
Constitution contains an explicit reference to the word 'privacy,' the word
is no more than an addendum to the search and seizure provision and has
been interpreted as such." 388
2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
South Carolina law requires that only one party need to consent to the
interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication for such
interception to be lawful.3 89  The statute begins differently than similar
provisions in other jurisdictions stating that the "interception of wire,
electronic, or oral communications is hereby authorized only in the manner
permitted by this chapter." 39 0 The chapter then makes it illegal to intercept,
use or disclose any wire, electronic or oral communication unless, among
other things, "a person not acting under color of law. . . intercept[s] a wire,
oral, or electronic communication where the person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to the interception., 3 91
As opposed to its less privacy protective one-party consent interception
provision, South Carolina has a more robust eavesdropping-or Peeping
Tom as it is called in the state code-statute. The language of the Peeping
Tom statute reads:
It is unlawful for a person to be an eavesdropper or a
peeping tom on or about the premises of another or to go
upon the premises of another for the purpose of becoming
an eavesdropper or a peeping tom. The term "peeping
tom", as used in this section, is defined as a person who
peeps through windows, doors, or other like places, on or
about the premises of another, for the purpose of spying
387 S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d. 775, 778 (S.C. 1991).
388 Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1142 (Summer 2002).
389 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-30(C) (2009).
390 Id. § 17-30-10.
391 Id. § 17-30-30(C).
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upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and
any other conduct of a similar nature, that tends to invade
the privacy of others. The term "peeping tom" also
includes any person who employs the use of video or audio
equipment for the purposes set forth in this section. A
person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not
more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.3 92
The code recognizes that the twenty-first century Peeping Tom can
monitor with sophisticated technology as well as with the naked eye and
covers technology in this statute as well. The statute defines a "place where
a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy" as "a place where
a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy,
without being concerned that his or her undressing was being
photographed, filmed, or videotaped by another; or a place where one
would reasonably expect to be safe from hostile intrusion or
surveillance."393 Under this prohibition, plaintiff-employees must prove
that they were in a private place and that their employer monitored their
activities in a manner that constituted spying or an invasion of privacy. The
invasion of privacy torts would likely be a good guide as to what constitutes
an invasion of privacy under this statute.
3. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
South Carolina law states that the "use of tobacco products outside the
workplace must not be the basis of personnel action, including, but not
limited to, employment, termination, demotion, or promotion of an
employee."394 It is important to remember that these types of lifestyle
discrimination statutes are modifications to the employment at will rule.
The state code has an entire section titled Personal Identifying
Information Privacy Protection. The South Carolina General Assembly
found that:
Although there are legitimate reasons for state and local
government entities to collect social security numbers and
other personal identifying information from individuals,
government entities should collect the information only for
legitimate purposes or when required by law. An entity
that provides employee benefits has a legitimate need to
collect and use social security numbers and personal
392 Id. § 16-17-470(A).
3 Id. § 16-17-470(D)(1)(a)-(b).
394 Id. § 41-1-85.
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identifying information as part of its administration and
provision of employee benefits programs.39 s
The Assembly also found that when "state and local government
entities possess social security numbers or other personal identifying
information, the governments should minimize the instances this
information is disseminated either internally within government or
externally with the general public."396 With this finding in mind, a state
statute requires that state agencies collecting SSNs adhere to nine specific
personal information privacy requirements (in addition to the proper and
safe disposal of SSN data).3 9 7 Similar restrictions also apply to the use of
SSNs by private parties such as businesses.3 9 8 The code also limits the
manner in which PII may be disseminated. 39 9 Finally:
All state agencies, boards, commissions, institutions,
departments, and other state entities, by whatever name
known, must develop privacy policies and procedures to
ensure that the collection of personal information
pertaining to citizens of the State is limited to such personal
information required by any such agency, board,
commission, institution, department, or other state entity
and necessary to fulfill a legitimate public purpose.40 0
If the state agency "hosts, supports, or provides a link to page or site
accessible through the world wide web, [it] must clearly display its privacy
policy and the name and telephone number of the agency, board,
commission, institution, department, or other state entity person responsible
for administration of the policy."401 The section concludes by stating that
"[w]here personal information is authorized to be collected by an entity
covered by this section, the entity must at the time of collection advise the
citizen to whom the information pertains that the information is subject to
public scrutiny or release."402
Id § 30-2-300(2).
6Id. § 30-2-300(3).
397 Id. § 30-2-310(A)(1)(a)-(i), (C).
398 See id § 37-20-180.
' See id. § 30-2-320.
400 Id § 30-2-20.
401 Id. § 30-2-40(A).
402 Id. § 30-2-40(B).
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AO. South Dakota
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In South Dakota, one party to a communication may intercept, or
authorize a third party to intercept, the communication.403 The pertinent
statute declares that a person is guilty of a Class 5 felony if he is not a
sender or receiver of a "telephone or telegraph communication [and]
intentionally and by means of an eavesdropping device overhears or records
a telephone or telegraph communication, or aids, authorizes, employs,
procures, or permits another to so do, without the consent of either a sender
or receiver thereof.'4 M The same is true if a person is "not present during a
conversation or discussion [and] intentionally and by means of an
eavesdropping device overhears or records such conversation or discussion,
or aids, authorizes, employs, procures, or permits another to so do, without
the consent of a party to such conversation or discussion."4 05 These two
provisions, by their express terms, exempt the sender and receiver of a
communication as well as a third party interceptor from punishment for
intercepting. This statute is similar to the federal requirement but is not
drafted in the same manner.
The Invasion Of Privacy section of the South Dakota code states that it
is a Class One misdemeanor when a person. "[i]nstalls in any private place,
without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any
device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting
sounds or events in such place, or uses any such unauthorized
installation."4 06  Sexual desire or gratification is not an element in this
statute making it much more applicable to the employment context.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
South Dakota law states:
It is a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an
employer to terminate the employment of an employee due
to that employee's engaging in any use of tobacco products
off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours
unless such a restriction:
(1) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement
and is reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a
403 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (2010).
404 Id. § 23A-35A-20(1).
40 Id. § 23A-35A-20(2).
406 Id. § 22-21-1(2).
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particular employee or a particular group of
employees, rather than to all employees of the
employer; or
(2) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance
of such a conflict of interest. 407
AP. Tennessee
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Under Tennessee Law:
It is lawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where
the person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
the interception, unless the communication is intercepted
for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act
in violation of the constitution or laws of the state of
Tennessee.40 8
If no party to the communication consents, then an interception by a
third party (not acting under the color of law) would likely be illegal.
On the eavesdropping front, Tennessee's Observation Without Consent
statute declares:
It is an offense for a person to knowingly spy upon,
observe or otherwise view an individual, when the
individual is in a place where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent
of the individual, if the viewing [w]ould offend or
embarrass an ordinary person if the person knew the person
was being viewed [and was] for the urpose of sexual
arousal or gratification of the defendant.
The sexual arousal or gratification requirements of this section likely
prohibit its use in all but the worst employer monitoring cases.
4071 d. § 60-4-11.
408 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (2010).
409 Id. § 39-13-607(a)(1)-(2).
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2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Tennessee law prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees based on employee use of agricultural products. More
specifically, the statute states that:
No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for
participating or engaging in the use of an agricultural
product not regulated by the alcoholic beverage
commission that is not otherwise proscribed by law, if the
employee participates or engages in the use in a manner
that complies with all applicable employer policies
regarding the use during times at which the employee is
working.4 10
This is the only lifestyle discrimination statute that looks at off-duty
employee consumption of agricultural products as opposed to the
consumption of alcohol or tobacco specifically.
The Tennessee Identity Theft Deterrence Act of 1999 (ITDA) contains
security breach provisions very similar to other states that protect PII after it
has been accessed inappropriately. 411 The ITDA also requires individuals
and businesses to adequately protect SSNs.412 The relevant part of the
statute concerning reads as follows:
On and after January 1, 2008, any person, nonprofit or for
profit business entity in this state . .. that has obtained a
federal social security number for a legitimate business or
governmental purpose shall make reasonable efforts to
protect that social security number from disclosure to the
public. Social security numbers shall not:
(1) Be posted or displayed in public;
(2) Be required to be transmitted over the Internet,
unless the Internet connection used is secure or the
social security number is encrypted;
(3) Be required to log onto or access an Internet
website, unless used in combination with a
password or other authentication device;
(4) Be printed on any materials mailed to a consumer,
unless the disclosure is required by law, or the
document is a form or application; or
(5) Be printed on any card, identification or badge that
the consumer must display or present in order to
4 10 Id. § 50-1-304(e)(1).
411 Id. § 47-18-2107.
4 121 d. § 47-18-2110.
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receive a benefit, good, service or other thing of
value to which the consumer is entitled based upon
the consumer's contract or other agreement with
the entity issuing the card, identification or
badge.4 13
Finally, Tennessee is one of a few states that require employers-in this
case state agency employers-to provide notice of e-mail monitoring
practices. More specifically, the statute reads that:
On or before July 1, 2000, the state or any agency,
institution, or political subdivision thereof that operates or
maintains an electronic mail communications system shall
adopt a written policy on any monitoring of electronic mail
communications and the circumstances under which it will
be conducted.. . . The policy shall include a statement
that correspondence of the employee in the form of
electronic mail may be a public record under the public
records law and may be subject to public inspection under
this part.4 14
The statute requires such notice even if no monitoring is scheduled to
take place. Perhaps a state agency could argue that it will never monitor
employee e-mail and, therefore, that it does not need a policy. However,
such a stance could easily be disclosed in a policy and would likely be
morale-boosting.
AQ. Texas
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Texas:
So long as a wire, oral, or electronic communication-
including the radio portion of any cordless telephone call-
is not recorded for a criminal or tortious purpose, anyone
who is a party to the communication, or who has the
consent of a party to the communication ... can lawfully
record the communication and disclose its contents.4 15
The cordless telephone situation mentioned in the statute arises often in
wiretapping cases where defendants claim that the use of a cordless phone
indicates that the user did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
4 1 31 d. § 47-18-2110(a)(1)-(5).
4 14 Id. § 10-7-512 (2010).
415 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Tex. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02
(West 2010)).
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Texas is one of the few states that expressly includes a cordless phone
provision in its wiretapping statute. This helps alleviate the court system
from dealing with wiretapping cases stemming from cordless phone use.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Texas law allows the State Department of Transportation to insert
RFID chips into state identification cards but requires that such information
gained be encrypted or secured from unauthorized access. 416 For example,
"[a] person [not only state agencies but any person] may not sell or
otherwise disclose biometric information accessed from an enhanced
driver's license or any information from an enhanced driver's license radio
frequency identification chip or similar technology to another person or an
affiliate of the person."" This provision indicates that Texas has chosen to
prohibit PII skimming legislatively instead of relying on invasion of privacy
tort cases.
The Texas code also states that a person "may not require an individual
to disclose the individual's social security number to obtain goods or
services from or enter into a business transaction with the person unless the
person [adopts a privacy policy dealing with the use of SSNs."418 On the
governmental front, state agencies in Texas are required to create and post a
privacy policy that:
(1) prescribes terms under which a person may use,
copy information from, or link to a generally
accessible Internet site maintained by or for a state
agency; and
(2) protects the personal information of members of
the public who access information from or through
a generally accessible Internet site maintained by
419
or for a state agency.
Additionally, a governmental agency is required to "prominently post a link
to the policy statement on a generally accessible Internet site maintained by
or for the agency."'420
416 TEX. TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 521.032(c) (West 2007).
417 Id. § 521.032(g).
4 1 81 d. § 501.052.
419 TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2054.126(a)(l}-{2).
4 2o Id. § 2054.126(b).
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AR Utah
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Utah state law requires that one party may legally consent to the
interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication. 4 2' Located with
the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, the relevant statute states that it is a
third degree felony when a person "intentionally or knowingly intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic, or oral communication."422 This
is the standard wiretapping prohibition found in federal law. One of the
exceptions states that:
[An intercepting person] not acting under color of law may
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication if that
person is a party to the communication or one of the parties
to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception, unless the communication is intercepted for
the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of state or federal laws.423
Utah has also enacted an eavesdropping statute. The pertinent part of
the statute states that a person commits a Class B misdemeanor when he:
(A) Trespasses on property with intent to subject
anyone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a
private place; or
(B) Installs in any private place, without the consent of
the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any
device for observing, photographing, recording,
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in the
place or uses any such unauthorized installation; or
(C) Installs or uses outside of a private place any
device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or
broadcasting sounds originating in the place which
would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible
outside, without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy there.4 24
A "private place" is defined under Utah law as "a place where one may
reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or
surveillance." 2 5 Under Utah's eavesdropping statute, an employee might
421 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4(7)(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
422 Id. § 77-23a-4(1)(b)(i).
423 Id. § 77-23a-4(7)(b).
424 Id. § 76-9-402.
4251 d. § 76-9-401(1).
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have a claim that she possessed a reasonable expectation that she would be
safe from casual and hostile surveillance in her workplace office. The
claim would be less strong in a work cubicle or in the hallways, as these
areas are less likely to be categorized as private places.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Utah has a unique chapter in its state code titled the Notice of Intent to
Sell Nonpublic Personal Information Act. This act states that a commercial
entity shall provide notice to a consumer if:
(i) The commercial entity enters into a consumer
transaction with that person;
(ii) As a result of the consumer transaction ... the
commercial entity obtains nonpublic personal
information concerning that person; and
(iii) The commercial entity intends to or wants the
ability to disclose the nonpublic personal
information:
(A) to a third party; and
(B) for compensation.A 2 6
These types of situations occur often in the world of PII collection.
Businesses often find that collected PII is useful not only to complete
business transactions but also to sell on the open market. If a business in
Utah chooses to disseminate PII, the state code has rules for when such
dissemination requires disclosure. In transactions requiring disclosure, the
compensation paid to the seller must be "(A) .. . the primary consideration
for the commercial entity disclosing the nonpublic personal information;
(B) ... directly related to the commercial entity disclosing the nonpublic
personal information; and (C)... not compensation received by the
commercial entity in consideration of a transaction."42 7 This type of statute
will likely prevent businesses from selling PII to avoid providing this type
of notice to customers. At the same time, this statute limits a PII use that is
valid in most every other state and on the federal level.
On the state government side of the equation, Utah's Governmental
Internet Information Privacy Act states that:
A governmental entity may not collect personally
identifiable information related to a user of the
governmental entity's governmental website unless the
governmental entity has taken reasonable steps to ensure
that on the day on which the personally identifiable
information is collected the governmental entity's
426 Id. § 13-37-201(1)(a)(i)-(iii).
427 Id. § 13-37-201(l)(a)(iv)(A)-C).
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governmental website [contains a privacy policy with six
required components.] 4 28
AS. Vermont
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Vermont law on the topic of electronic monitoring and eavesdropping
in the workplace is rather unique. It is unique in the fact that there "are no
specific statutes in Vermont addressing interception of communications
[although] the state's highest court has held that surreptitious electronic
monitoring of communications in a person's home is an unlawful invasion
of privacy."429 Vermont is the only state that has not enacted either a one-
party or two-party consent statute. The state assembly has likely decided
that tort law and precedent is sufficient to handle potential invasions of
privacy stemming from wiretapping.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
On the RFID front, Vermont law requires a radio frequency
identification device to be implanted in a state identification card (i.e.,
driver's license). More specifically, the law states, among other things, that
the "face of an enhanced license shall contain the individual's name, date of
birth, gender, a unique identification number, full facial photograph or
imaged likeness [and a] vicinity Radio Frequency Identification chip shall
be embedded in the enhanced license in compliance with the security
standards of the Department of Homeland Security."43 0 Any additional
personal identity information not currently required by the Department of
Homeland Security "shall need the approval of either the general assembly
or the legislative committee on administrative rules prior to the
implementation of the requirements.'4 3 1 This data is supposed to remain
reasonably secure as Vermont law states that no "person shall compile or
maintain a database of electronically readable information derived from an
operator's license." 43 2 The law also states that personal radio frequency
identification chip numbers "shall be given protections as codified in [the
federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act].'
428 Id. § 63D-2-103(1)-(2).
429 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Vt.
430 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7 (2010) (emphasis added).
431 id.
432 Id. § 7(c).
433 Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
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AT. Virginia
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Virginia law allows one party to consent to the interception of a wire,
electronic, or oral communication. In fact, it is a Class 6 felony in the state
when a person "[i]ntentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, electronic
or oral communication."43 4 The code then grants an exception to the rule
stating that it "shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person
to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is
a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception."" This statute does not add
the extra provisions, which state that, regardless of consent, an interception
may not occur for criminal and/or tortious purposes. Perhaps other chapters
in the state's penal code would deal with such situations.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
The Virginia state code provides that the Department of Motor Vehicles
"shall not comply with any federal law or regulation that would require the
Department to use any type of computer chip or radio-frequency
identification tag or other similar device on or in a driver's license or
special identification card."436 This provision is 180 degrees different from
those of other states-such as Vermont-that actually require the use of
RFID chips in driver's licenses.
Along these lines, Virginia take steps to protect an individual's PII that
has been collected by a third party from misuse and from falling into the
wrong hands. The General Assembly of Virginia made findings that:
1. An individual's privacy is directly affected by the
extensive collection, maintenance, use and
dissemination of personal information;
2. The increasing use of computers and sophisticated
information technology has greatly magnified the
harm that can occur from these practices;
3. An individual's opportunities to secure
employment, insurance, credit, and his right to due
process, and other legal protections are endangered
by the misuse of certain of these personal
information systems; and
434 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62(A)(1) (2010).
435 Id. § 19.2-62(B)(2).
436 Id. § 46.2-323.01.
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4. In order to preserve the rights guaranteed a citizen
in a free society, legislation is necessary to
establish procedures to govern information systems
containing records on individuals.43 7
With these privacy protective findings in mind, all Virginia state
agencies that create Web sites are required to create and post privacy
policies that discuss how such information is handled.438 More specifically:
Every public body . .. that has an Internet website
associated with that public body shall develop an Internet
privacy policy and an Internet privacy policy statement that
explains the policy to the public . ... The statement shall
be made available on the public body's website in a
conspicuous manner. The Secretary of Technology or his
designee shall provide guidelines for developing the policy
and the statement, and each public body shall tailor the
policy and the statement to reflect the information practices
of the individual public body. At minimum, the policy and
the statement shall address (i) what information, including
personally identifiable information, will be collected, if
any; (ii) whether any information will be automatically
collected simply by accessing the website and, if so, what
information; (iii) whether the website automatically places
a computer file, commonly referred to as a "cookie," on the
Internet user's computer and, if so, for what purpose; and
(iv) how the collected information is being used or will be
used.439
In addition to the privacy policy requirement, the state code also
provides more specific protection for individuals when state agencies
collect their P11.440 This is necessary because the privacy policy provision
only requires that state agencies declare how PII will be collected and
handled. The relevant PII protection statute reads that "it shall be unlawful
for any agency to disclose the social security number or other identification
numbers appearing on driver's licenses or information on credit cards, debit
cards, bank accounts, or other electronic billing and payment systems that
was supplied to an agency for the purpose of paying fees, fines, taxes, or
other charges collected by such agency."
437 Id. § 2.2-3800.
438 Id. § 2.2-3803(10)(B).
439 id.
440 See id. § 2.2-3808.
' Id. § 2.2-3808.1 (2010); see also id. § 2.2-3815 (requiring that the first five
digits of a SSN in a public record remain private and secure from disclosure).
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AU. Washington
1. Constitutional Privacy Protection
The state of Washington takes P11 privacy more seriously than most of
the other state codes. This occurs primarily through each of the following
restrictions: (1) an all-party consent requirement for wiretapping, (2) a
requirement that government agencies protect PII held on RFID chips and
(3) strong protections against invasions of privacy based on the disclosure
of information contained in public records. Somewhat important is the
right to privacy contained in Article I, Section 7 of the state constitution.
This provision states that: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."4 2 Although this
provision does not state that only invasions caused by state actors are
prohibited, precedent makes the case very clearly. For example, a 1986
case styled Trumbauer v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound held
that both clauses of this constitutional provision may only be violated via
state action." 3 In its own words, the court held that the "due process and
search and seizure provisions of the Washington State Constitution apply
only to state action. Trumbauer's claims under these provisions must be
dismissed because Trumbauer's allegations present a purely private
dispute."44 With this state action requirement in mind, individuals
experiencing privacy invasions from private actors/businesses as well as
employees working in the private sector gain little protection from this
section of the Washington Constitution.
2. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
In Washington, all parties to a private communication must consent to
its interception." 5 The state code makes it unlawful for any individual,
[business,] ... or the state of Washington . .. to intercept, or record any:
(a) Private communication transmitted by telephone,
telegraph, radio, or other device between two or
more individuals between points within or without
the state by any device electronic or otherwise
designed to record and/or transmit said
communication regardless how such device is
powered or actuated, without first obtaining the
442 WASH. CONST. art. I, § VII (emphasis added).
44 Trumbauer v. Grp. Health Co-op. of Puget Sound, 635 F. Supp. 543, 549 (W.D.
Wash. 1986).
44 Id. (internal citations omitted).
44 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (2010).
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consent of all the participants in the
communication;
(b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or
otherwise designed to record or transmit such
conversation regardless how the device is powered
or actuated without first obtaining the consent of
all the persons engaged in the conversation." 6
The word private is inserted before the terms communication and
conversation in Washington's wiretapping/eavesdropping statute. This
likely restricts interceptions to communications where parties have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the "all-party consent
requirement can be satisfied if 'one party has announced to all other parties
engaged in the communication or conversation, in any reasonably effective
manner, that such communication or conversation is about to be recorded or
transmitted."'4 7 This required announcement would make it impossible for
employers to covertly monitor a communication between two or more
employees to which the employer either was or was not a participant. In
addition, "if the conversation is to be recorded, the requisite announcement
must be recorded as well."
3. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Washington law delineates the requirements necessary for an individual
to obtain a driver's license or a state identification card (called an identicard
in Washington)." 9 As part of this process, the state code also requires that
the "enhanced driver's license or identicard must include reasonable
security measures to protect the privacy of Washington state residents,
including reasonable safeguards to protect against unauthorized disclosure
of data about Washington state residents.'so If the enhanced driver's
license or identicard "includes a radio frequency identification chip, or
44 Id. § 9.73.030(l)(a)-(b).
44 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at Wash. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030
(2010)).
4 8 id.
449 See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.117 (2010).
450 Id. § 46.20.202; see also id. § 42.56.330(8). Stating that the:
[Plersonally identifying information of persons who acquire and
use a driver's license or identicard that includes a radio frequency
identification chip or similar technology to facilitate border
crossing ... may be disclosed in aggregate form as long as the
data does not contain any personally identifying information.
Personally identifying information may be released to law
enforcement agencies for other purposes only if the request is
accompanied by a court order.
Id.
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similar technology, the department shall ensure that the technology is
encrypted or otherwise secure from unauthorized data access."451 It is also
a crime under Washington law to use RFID technology to skim (i.e.,
intercept) PII from an individual's identification documents. More
specifically, Washington law states that "a person is guilty of a class C
felony if the person intentionally possesses, or reads or captures remotely
using radio waves, information contained on another person's identification
document, including the unique personal identifier number encoded on the
identification document, without that person's express knowledge or
,,452
consent. Unintentionally reading such information is not a crime as
long as it is not disclosed, used or stored, and as long as the information
gleaned is promptly destroyed. 453  Finally, neither- a governmental nor
business entity may "remotely read an identification device using radio
frequency identification technology for commercial purposes, unless that
governmental or business entity, or one of their affiliates, is the same
governmental or business entity that issued the identification device.'A54
This is another provision targeted at protecting PII from skimming.
When it comes to disclosure of PII contained in public records under
Washington's Public Records Act, a "person's 'right to privacy' . . . is
invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1)
[w]ould be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.'"A The code continues on to state that the
"provisions of this chapter dealing with the right to privacy in certain public
records do not create any right of privacy beyond those rights that are
specified in this chapter as express exemptions from the public's right to
inspect, examine, or copy public records.45 6
AV. West Virginia
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
West Virginia is a one-party consent state. More specifically:
Recording a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or
disclosing its contents, is not a violation of West Virginia
law when the person recording is a party to the
communication or has obtained consent from one of the
451 Id. § 46.20.202 (2010).
452 Id. § 9A.58.020.
453 Id. § 9A.58.020(2)(c)(i)iii).
454 Id. § 19.3.030.
455 Id. § 42.56.050.
456 id.
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parties, so long as the recording is not accompanied by a
criminal or tortious intent.457
As with the other rather standardized one-party consent statutes, West
Virginia's wiretapping legislation allows for the authorization of a third
party-uninvolved in the actual conversation-to intercept the
communication.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
West Virginia law prohibits discrimination against employees who use
tobacco products. The relevant statute states that it:
[S]hall be unlawful for any employer, whether public or
private, or the agent of such employer to refuse to hire any
individual or to discharge any employee or otherwise to
disadvantage or penalize any employee with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment solely because such individual uses tobacco
products off the premises of the employer during
nonworking hours.458
Certain non-profits whose purposes or objectives discourage the use of
one or more tobacco products by the general public may discriminate in this
respect. 459
Employers are still allowed to offer, impose or have in effect "a health,
disability or life insurance policy which makes distinctions between
employees for type of coverage or price of coverage based upon the
employee's use of tobacco products.'A60 Finally, nothing in this lifestyle
discrimination section "shall be construed to prohibit an employer from
making available to smokers and other users of tobacco products, programs,
free of charge or at reduced rates, which encourage the reduction or
cessation of smoking or tobacco use."461 This provision allows employers
to be creative in encouraging their employees to quit smoking even though
they cannot legally force them to do so.
457 CAN WE TAPE?, supra note 41, at W. Va. (citing W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-3
(2010)).
458 W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (2010).
459 See id. § 21-3-19(b).
460 Id. § 21-3-19(c) (stating, however, that "any differential premium rates charged
to employees [through such a plan] must reflect differential costs to the employer
[and that] the employer must provide employees with a statement delineating the
differential rates used by its insurance carriers").
461 Id. § 21-3-19(d).
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AW. Wisconsin
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Wisconsin's wiretapping statute allows one party to a conversation to
monitor/intercept the communication itself or consent to a third party's
462 tiinterception of such conversation. With this consent provision,
Wisconsin joins the vast majority of states that have enacted one-party
consent statutes similar to federal law.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Wisconsin is one of the few states that prohibit the forced implantation
of an RFID microchip.463 A serious fine is attached to violations of this
statute; more specifically, the code states that any "person who violates
[this implantation prohibition] may be required to forfeit not more than
[$]10,000. Each day of continued violation constitutes a separate
offense."464 Although no prison time is at stake, this large fine structure
could lead to a huge total as long as an illegally placed RFID chip remains
implanted in an individual.
Wisconsin state law also provides that
[N]o employer ... or other person may engage in any act
of employment discrimination ... against any individual on
the basis of age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status,
sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record, conviction
record, military service, or use or nonuse of lawful
products off the employers premises during nonworking
hours.465
The most interesting aspect of Wisconsin's lifestyle discrimination
statute is that discrimination is prohibition for off-duty use or nonuse of
lawful products. This "nonuse" clause would likely prohibit employers
from forcing employees to take medicine to relieve the flu that is keeping
the employee out of work. It will be interesting to track this provision to
see if the "nonuse" clause rears its head in the case law.
Certain non-profit entities are exempt from this lifestyle discrimination
prohibition. For example, the statute states that it is not discriminatory for
employers in non-profit corporations to prohibit the off-duty use of a
"lawful product [as long as such corporation] as one of its primary purposes
462 WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (2010).
4 See id. § 146.25.
4 Id.
45Id. § 111.321 (emphasis added).
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or objectives, discourages the general public from using a lawful
product.A6 6 In addition, non-profit corporations may legally choose:
[To] refuse to hire or employ an individual, to suspend or
terminate the employment of an individual, or to
discriminate against an individual in promotion, in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because that individual uses off the
employers premises during nonworking hours a lawful
product that the nonprofit corporation discourages the
467general public from using.
AX. Wyoming
1. Electronic Monitoring & Eavesdropping
Wyoming law allows only one party to a conversation to intercept such
communication or consent to its interception by a third party. More
specifically, the state law reads that "no person shall
intentionally . .. intercept, attempt to intercept, or procure any other person
to intercept or attempt to intercept any wire, oral or electronic
communication." 68 This language is fairly standard among states with one
party consent provisions and looks not only at interceptions but also at
attempted interceptions and conspiracies to intercept. However, the one-
party consent exemption allows any person to intercept an oral, wire or
electronic communication "where the person is [either] a party to the
communication or where one .. . of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act.69
The most privacy protective aspect of this exception is the use of the word
phrase "any criminal or tortious act." This type of restriction on the
exception is as broad as can be found in any state wiretapping statute based
on one-party consent.
2. Miscellaneous Privacy Protection
Wyoming law states that it is a discriminatory or unfair labor practice
for an employer:
[T]o require as a condition of employment that any
employee or prospective employee use or refrain from
using tobacco products outside the course of his
4  Id. § 111.35.
47id.
468 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702 (2010).
4 69 Id. § 7-3-702(b)(iv).
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employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any
person in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions
or privileges of employment on the basis of use or nonuse
of tobacco products outside the course of his
employment.470
A relevant exception to this statute allows such discrimination as long
as it is part of a "bona fide occupational qualification that a person not use
tobacco products outside the workplace."A7 1 However, nothing in this
section of the state code would "prohibit an employer from offering,
imposing or having in effect a health, disability or life insurance policy
distinguishing between employees for type or price of coverage based upon
the use or nonuse of tobacco products" under most circumstances.472
Considering the ever-increasing costs of health care and health-care
deductibles, this provision might be used by employers to entice employees
with a quasi-financial incentive to stop using tobacco products.
V. CONCLUSION
The American economy is going through some of the toughest times in
recent memory. As businesses struggled and consumers found themselves
in over their heads, the federal government immersed itself in the middle of
colossal bailouts of major economic sectors. Problematically, as the
economy begins to work itself back to stability and growth, serious
problems linger. One of the most prominent of these problems stems from
the potential for increasingly sophisticated technology operated by the
government and the private sector to invade individual privacy. At the
same time, consumers and businesses alike lack a clear national standard
guiding the monitoring of persons and their personally identifying
information.
State governments across the country continue to feel the heat from
angry constituents and continually attempt to fill the breach by sporadically
passing diverse privacy protection statutes. Some statutes deal with
wiretapping, while others deal with employees' off-duty lifestyles, genetic
testing, P11 protection and RIFD tracking. The result has been a patchwork
of privacy protection laws. Problematically, the patchwork of regulation
that has been created has the potential to make the problem much worse.
Businesses operating in interstate commerce must abide by potentially fifty
different state laws. Employers, employees and consumers who move from
state to state are likely to find themselves confused as to how these diverse
laws protect them. At the end of the day, the best course to remedy the
4701Id. § 27-9-105(a)(iv).
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problem is for Congress to create a national standard. Until then, this
Article has attempted to locate, categorize and evaluate relevant statutes
across the fifty states. It is time for the federal government to end the state
bailout when it comes to protecting individuals from invasion of privacy by
sophisticated monitoring technology.
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